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I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2005, the United States Army conducted an informal sur-
vey in which soldiers and their spouses or significant others rated their
top concerns as a result of the soldier's deployment.' The survey re-
vealed that soldiers and their partners had one concern that was even
greater than the soldier's injury or death.2 That concern was divorce.3
In the Army alone, from 2003 to 2004, the divorce rate increased 78%,
which more than tripled the rate of divorce in 2002, largely because of the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 The increase in divorce rate has been par-
ticularly significant among officers Despite new and redeveloped mar-
riage support programs in the respective services,6 the divorce rate among
military personnel continues to rise.
The significance of the divorce rate in the military must be understood
in the context of the lack of uniformity among state courts charged with
distributing military retirement benefits upon the dissolution of marriage,
particularly that portion of retired pay that is waived for disability bene-
fits. When state courts distribute marital property of disabled military
1. See Donna Miles, Army Divorce Rates Drop as Marriage Programs Gain Momen-




4. See War Swells US Army Divorce Rate, BBC NEWS, June 8, 2005, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/americas/4075270.stm; see also Lisa Burgess, Divorce Rate Among Active-Duty
Army Officers, Enlisted Has Risen Dramatically, STARS AND STRIPES, June 9, 2005,
http://estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=28797&archive=true.
5. See War Swells US Army Divorce Rate, supra note 4. Between January and Sep-
tember 2002, the rate of divorce was 1.9% for married Army officers and 3.1% for enlisted
soldiers. Id. After the commencement of the Iraq war in 2003, the divorce rate for officers
rose to 3.3%, while the rate for enlisted soldiers stayed relatively close at 2.8%. Id. In
2004, the figures increased to 6% for officers and 3.5% for enlisted soldiers. Id. These
figures may be slightly skewed because they do not account for divorced military personnel
who were married to other military personnel.
6. Miles, supra note 1. In response to the soaring divorce rate, particularly among
officers, the military implemented new marriage programs, which have evidenced some
success. See id. For example, in 2004, 3325 Army officers (6%) got divorced; in 2005, that
figure dropped to 1292 (2.3%). Id. Although the number of divorces for enlisted soldiers
stayed roughly the same (7152 in 2004; 7075 in 2005), this was, nevertheless, a 61% drop in
divorce for Army officers following the spike in 2004. Id. The Marine Corps and the Navy
have similar marriage support programs. Id. The Air Force has marriage counseling pro-
grams on individual bases, but it does not have a service-wide support program. Id.
7. See Burgess, supra note 4. The divorce rate for Marine officers remained around
1.8% between 2001 and 2004, while the divorce rate for enlisted Marines remained at
around 3.5%. Id. In the Air Force, between 2001 and 2004, the divorce rate for officers
went from 1.2% to 1.5%, while the divorce rate for enlisted personnel went from 3% to
3.8%. Id. In the Navy, between 2001 and 2004, the divorce rate for officers increased from
1.5% to 2.5%, and the divorce rate for enlisted personnel increased from 3.2% to 3.9%.
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retirees, there are basically two categories of property that must be con-
sidered: (1) military retired pay, which is subject to the federal payment
scheme (Box A); and (2) other marital property that is subject to equita-
ble or community property distribution under the respective state prop-
erty distribution schemes (Box B). (See Table 1).
Retired Pay Other Marital Properly
(Federal Sch )eme)
[Matal Property] [Martal Property]
__~t Wr~tdtabta eeemtrpdy
~ ; ~ Perperlyl
Table 18
The federal military payment scheme follows specific guidelines. Mili-
tary personnel who serve for at least twenty years may retire with retired
pay.9 The amount of retired pay is determined by the number of years
served and the rank at which the member retires.10 For example, if the
wife is an officer with an active duty base salary of $2,000 per month, re-
tired pay is calculated by multiplying her active duty base pay by her
years of service by 2.5%. Thus, the wife's retired pay would be $2,000 x
20 years x 2.5%, or $1,000 per month. Pursuant to the Uniformed Ser-
8. Key for Tables 1-6:
- Marital property
Each party's respective separate share of marital property
Separate property
9. See 10 U.S.C. § 3911 (2000) (Army); id. § 6323 (Navy and Marine Corps); id. §
8911 (Air Force).
10. See id. §§ 3929, 3991 (Army); id. §§ 6325-27 (Navy and Marine Corps); id. § 8929,
8991 (Air Force). There are several different methods by which retired pay may be calcu-
lated depending on a variety of variables that might affect any given formulaic application,
all of which are beyond the scope of this Article. Therefore, any calculations offered in
this Article are generally derived for purposes of demonstration.
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vices Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA)," specifically 10 U.S.C.
§ 1408(a)(4), this amount is categorized as "disposable retired pay.
' 12
Upon the dissolution of marriage, state courts have the authority to dis-
tribute disposable retired pay as marital property.13 But the USFSPA
imposes limitations on state court authority to distribute this category of
property. 4 Sections 1408(d)(1) and 1408(d)(5) allow for a former spouse
to obtain his or her interest in such an award directly from the govern-
ment;5 however, § 1408(e)(1) limits the direct payment from the govern-
ment to 50% of the disposable retired pay." This limitation assures that
the military retiree will actually acquire at least half of the retired pay,
with limited exceptions.1 7 Thus, in Table 2 below, if the wife receives
11. Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA), Pub. L. No. 97-
252, 96 Stat. 730 (1982).
12. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) (2000) ("The term 'disposable retired pay' means the total
monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled [other than the retired pay of a member
retired for disability under Title 38]."). Note that, prior to 1990, § 1408(a)(4) referred to
the term "retired or retainer pay." In 1990, Congress substituted the term "retired pay"
for "retired or retainer pay" and added subsection (a)(7), which provides that the term
"retired" pay includes retainer pay. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 510, § 555(f), 104 Stat. 1485, 1570 (1990). Thus, when discussing
pre-1990 references to the language of § 1408(a)(4), this Article sometimes refers to "re-
tired or retainer pay." All other references are to "retired pay" in accordance with the
current language of that provision.
13. Id. § 1408(c)(1) ("Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat dis-
posable retired pay payable to a member for pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981,
either as property solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in
accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court.").
14. See id. § 1408(e).
15. 10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(d)(1) (West Supp. 2006) ("After effective service on the Secre-
tary concerned of a court order providing for the payment of child support or alimony or,
with respect to a division of property, specifically providing for the payment of an amount
of the disposable retired pay from a member to the spouse or a former spouse of the mem-
ber, the Secretary shall make payments... from the disposable retired pay of the member
to the spouse or former spouse ... in an amount sufficient to satisfy the amount of child
support and alimony set forth in the court order and, with respect to a division of property,
in the amount of disposable retired pay specifically provided for in the court order."); id. §
1408(d)(5) ("If a court order described in [§ 1408(d)(1)] provides for a division of property
(including a division of community property) in addition to an amount of child support or
alimony or the payment of an amount of disposable retired pay as the result of the court's
treatment of such pay under [§ 1408(c)] as property of the member and his spouse, the
Secretary concerned shall pay ... from the disposable retired pay of the member to the
spouse or former spouse of the member, any part of the amount payable to the spouse or
former spouse under the division of property upon effective service of a final court order
of garnishment of such amount from such retired pay.").
16. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(1) (2000) ("The total amount of the disposable retired pay of
a member payable under all court orders pursuant to [§ 1408(c)] may not exceed 50 per-
cent of such disposable retired pay.").
17. See id. § 1408(e)(4)(B) (providing for a 65% maximum garnishment limit respect-




$1,000 of disposable retired pay (Box A), the husband may obtain-
through state court order-up to 50% ($500) to satisfy his marital interest
in the wife's retired pay (Box Al). The remaining 50% is not subject to
state court orders invoking § 1408(d)(5) and § 1408(e)(1) for direct pay-
ment, but it remains marital property that accrued during the marriage,
and, thus, despite limitations on distribution, remains marital property
(Box A2). In addition to this property, state courts have the authority to
distribute all other marital property in accordance with their respective
property distribution schemes (Box B). (See Table 2).
Box A 
Box B
Disposable Refired Pay Other Marital Property
$1 ,000
[Marital Propery Martal Property]
UtI4O5)ara{8I] o8fral~ sM Othe!A.41 P~p" Sh1t,M ait(Ppepty
fMarUta Propertyl fkfM rni operty Praprty9faialPo ry
Table 2
Disability benefits are available to veterans who became disabled as a
result of their military service. 8 The amount of disability is dependent
upon the seriousness of the disability and the degree to which the disabil-
ity impairs a veteran's ability to earn a living.9 In the example dia-
grammed above, a disability rating of 40% would make the wife's disabil-
ity pay $2,000 x 40%, which is $800. Disability pay is the separate prop-
erty of the participant. However, if a veteran is to receive disability bene-
fits, to avoid double-dipping, he or she must waive a corresponding
amount of retired pay.20 Thus, assuming the parties have $10,000 of other
marital property, if the wife is 40% disabled and opts to waive a portion
of her retired pay for disability benefits, a state court distributing prop-
erty would consider the following:
18. 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2000) (basic entitlement).
19. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1114 (West Supp. 2006).
20. Id. § 5305. Many military personnel take advantage of this option because of the
tax benefits-retirement pay is taxable, whereas disability pay is exempt from federal,
state, and local taxation-and because of its ancillary benefits, such as medical care pro-
vided by the Veterans Administration. See id. § 5301(a); see also Bewley v. Bewley, 780
P.2d 596, 597 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) (describing benefits of disability waivers).
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Table 3
The wife's total retired pay would still be $1,000. Upon unilaterally
waiving a portion of retired pay for disability pay, the wife's retired pay
would consist of $800 tax-exempt, separate property disability pay (Box
A), plus $200 in disposable retired pay (Box B). Pursuant to § 1408(d)(5)
and § 1408(e)(1), a state court may order only $100 of the wife's dispos-
able retired pay to be paid directly to the husband (Box B1). Thus, the
wife will receive $100 of disposable retired pay as the non-assignable re-
mainder (Box B2), plus $800 of tax-exempt, separate property disability
pay (Box A), while the husband receives only $100 of disposable retired
pay (Box B1) -$400 less than what he would receive absent the unilateral
waiver by his wife. Of course, the state court is free to distribute all other
marital property (Box C) according to its own property distribution
scheme. Assuming a 50/50 distribution, each spouse would receive $5,000
(Boxes C1 and C2, respectively).
Thus, when a disabled military retiree waives a portion of his or her re-
tired pay to receive disability benefits, the former spouse is effectively
deprived of a portion of distributable marital property that he or she oth-
erwise would have received as a marital interest in retired pay if that por-
tion had not been waived for disability benefits.
Share Upon Divorce Without Disability Waiver
Share of Share of Other
Retired Pay Marital Property Total





Share Upon Divorce With 40% Disability Waiver
Share of Share of Share of Other
Retired Pay Disability Pay Marital Property Total
Military Member: $100 $800* $5,000 $5,900
Former Spouse: $100 0 $5,000 $5,100
* Tax-exempt
Because of the distinct natures of retired and disability pay and the pur-
poses behind the federal military payment scheme, such a seemingly in-
equitable distribution of marital property is allowed under the definitions
of the USFSPA. There is much inconsistency among state courts, how-
ever, with respect to whether state courts may remedy this resulting ineq-
uity by offsetting the waived portion of retired pay-the amount allo-
cated to Box A-with other distributable marital property from Box C.21
It is within these categories that state courts must facilitate equity for the
parties without jeopardizing the objectives of the federal military pay-
ment scheme.
The issue of state court authority to offset nondistributable federal
benefits has arisen in various other contexts. In considering the distribu-
tion of Social Security benefits, some state courtse prohibit offsetting
based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo,'3 in which the Court held that state courts are preempted by
federal law from either distributing directly or offsetting in marital disso-
lution proceedings benefits provided under the Federal Railroad Retire-
ment Act.Y4 Other state courts have offset nondistributable portions of
Social Security benefits by considering those benefits in distributing mari-
tal property under their respective equitable distribution or community
property distribution schemes.25 Thus, among state courts considering
21. See, e.g., Eickelberger v. Eickelberger, 638 N.E.2d 130, 135 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)
(offsetting by considering the military spouse's income as part of an equitable scheme); see
also infra note 317 (listing all state property distribution provisions).
22. See, e.g., In re Marriage of James, 950 P.2d 624, 628-29 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997);
Johnson v. Johnson, 726 So. 2d 393, 395-96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); In re Marriage of
Crook, 813 N.E.2d 198, 201-06 (I11. 2004); In re Marriage of Boyer, 538 N.W.2d 293, 294-95
(Iowa 1995); In re Marriage of Berthiaume, No. C5-90-2392, 1991 WL 90839, at *1-2
(Minn. Ct. App. June 4, 1991); Webster v. Webster, 716 N.W.2d 47, 54-56 (Neb. 2006);
Olson v. Olson, 445 N.W.2d 1, 6-7, 11 (N.D. 1989); Reymann v. Reymann, 919 S.W.2d 615,
616-17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
23. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
24. Id. at 586-90.
25. See, e.g., Rimel v. Rimel, No. 605-MDA-2005, 2006 WL 3526777, at *1-2 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 2006); see also Kelly v. Kelly, 9 P.3d 1046, 1048-49 (Ariz. 2000); Panetta
20071
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offsetting, there is no more uniformity in one context of federal benefits
than there is in any other.
Now the issue of offsetting is ripe within the context of military retire-
ment benefits. Within this context, some courts and commentators have
charged Congress to amend the USFSPA to specifically authorize state
courts to offset with other distributable marital property the portion of
retired pay that is waived for disability pay under 38 U.S.C. § 5305.26 Ar-
guably, in doing so, Congress would bring uniformity to state courts
charged with distributing military retirement benefits upon the dissolu-
tion of marriage. Congress also would do equity for former spouses who
contributed during the marriage to the acquisition of those retirement
benefits but who are deprived of the benefit of that contribution because
the military spouse unilaterally opted to waive a portion of that contribu-
tion to obtain disability benefits for himself or herself. This Article pro-
poses, however, that while the objectives of uniformity and equity must
be accomplished, they need not be accomplished by an act of Congress.
Instead, pursuant to the USFSPA, Congress has already sufficiently
structured the federal payment scheme for military retirement funds to
allow state courts to accomplish the equitable distribution of marital
property through the respective state community property or equitable
distribution schemes, while still accomplishing the objectives underlying
the federal payment scheme. For Congress to act to remedy the inconsis-
tency among state courts with respect to offsetting the waived portion of
military retired pay, Congress necessarily would have to preempt state
courts from any distribution of marital property of disabled military retir-
ees. Such a remedy is neither equitable nor necessary to accomplish the
objectives of the federal military retirement payment scheme. In fact,
v. Panetta, 851 A.2d 720, 727-29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); Eickelberger, 638 N.E.2d
at 134-35; Cornbleth v. Cornbleth, 580 A.2d 369,371-73 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
26. See, e.g., Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594 (1989); McCarty v. McCarty, 453
U.S. 210, 236 (1981); Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 575; see also Mary Elizabeth Hammerstrom,
Equitable Distribution of Military Pensions? Re-thinking the Uniformed Services Former
Spouses Protection Act, 9 LAW & INEQ. 315, 319 (1991) (suggesting that Congress amend
the USFSPA "to authorize division of the gross amount of military pensions as marital
property upon divorce").
As will be discussed in Part VII, there is much discrepancy over what is meant by "off-
setting." There is clear consensus that offsetting by awarding a direct and calculable figure
from non-distributable property is impermissible. See, e.g., Webster, 716 N.W.2d at 54.
Courts disagree, however, as to whether offsetting by considering nondivisible property in
a distribution award and indirectly awarding a proportionate amount of other marital
property is permissible, or whether this is simply an empty distinction and the equivalent
of awarding non-distributable property. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hillerman, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 240, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Crook, 813 N.E.2d at 204-06; Webster, 716 N.W.2d at
56 (citing Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994)); Wolff v. Wolff, 929 P.2d 916, 921 (Nev.
1996); English v. English, 879 P.2d 802, 807-08 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); Olson, 445 N.W.2d at
11; In re Marriage of Swan, 720 P.2d 747,751 (Or. 1986); Reymann, 919 S.W.2d at 617.
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such an act of Congress would contradict the very purpose for which it
created the USFSPA.
Part II of this Article describes the posture of state courts distributing
military retirement benefits prior to the USFSPA and prior to the United
States Supreme Court's decision in McCarty v. McCarty.7 In McCarty,
the Court held that federal law preempted state law with respect to the
distribution of federal military retirement benefits.2 The McCarty Court
based its decision on its earlier decision in Hisquierdo.2 Thus, until 1981,
state courts were free to distribute federal military retirement monies
according to their respective state distribution schemes. After the
McCarty decision, however, state courts were subject to federal law re-
garding such distributions. Part III describes the McCarty decision and
its effect on state courts after 1981.
In 1982, in direct response to the McCarty decision, Congress enacted
the USFSPA.0 Under the USFSPA, Congress superseded the McCarty
decision by expressly authorizing state courts to distribute disposable
retired pay upon the dissolution of marriage.3 The USFSPA and its ef-
fect on state court authority to distribute military retirement benefits is
discussed in Part IV.
Despite Congress' authorization for state court authority under the
USFSPA, state courts varied in their interpretations of the scope of their
authority under the USFSPA. In 1989, the United States Supreme Court
attempted to clarify the application of the USFSPA by holding in Mansell
v. Manself 2 that, under the USFSPA, the scope of state court authority to
distribute military retirement pay is limited to disposable marital prop-
erty, which does not include that portion of retired pay that is waived
under 38 U.S.C. § 5305 to obtain disability benefits. 33 The Court held that
portion of retired pay to be the separate property of the disabled military
retiree.34 The Mansell decision is discussed in Part V.
After 1989, as a result of the limitations placed upon state courts after
the Mansell decision, some state courts distributing military retirement
benefits began to offset with other disposable marital property that por-
tion of military retired pay that was waived to receive disability benefits.35
Other state courts, however, specifically provided that the Supremacy
27. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 210.
28. Id. at 236.
29. Cf. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 583-84, 588-90.
30. USFSPA, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 730 (1982) (codified as amended at 10
U.S.C. § 1408 (Supp. IV 2004)).
31. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(2)(C), (a)(4) (2000).
32. 490 U.S. 581 (1989).
33. Id. at 594-95.
34. Id.
35. See supra note 25.
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Clause of the United States Constitution16 and the anti-assignment clause
within the USFSPA prohibited state courts from offsetting marital prop-
erty in this way.37 This discontinuity is described in Part VI.
State court inconsistency in offsetting military retired pay, as well as
Social Security benefits, has come to the forefront of the application of
state law. Historically, Congress has been called upon to resolve such• • • 38
inconsistencies. However, this Article proposes that, although, on its
face, the USFSPA opens the door to inequitable results for former
spouses with respect to disability pay, Congress has already afforded state
courts the authority to remedy this inequity through the application of
the respective state property distribution schemes. In Part VII, this Arti-
cle demonstrates why the application of state property distribution
schemes to the division of military retired pay does not interfere with the
objectives of the federal payment scheme.
This Article concludes that Congress need not act to provide uniform-
ity among state courts regarding the distribution of military retired pay.
Instead, state courts must act to offset with other marital property,
through the application of their respective property distribution schemes,
that portion of military retired pay that is waived for disability pay. For
state courts to overlook this remedy and wait for Congress to amend the
USFSPA to allow offsetting of disability benefits in the distribution of
property upon divorce is to overlook the authority that Congress has al-
ready afforded state courts through the USFSPA.
II. STATE LAW PRIOR TO THE USFSPA
Prior to 1981, state courts considering the distribution of military re-
tired pay upon divorce were free to employ their own applicable property
distribution schemes. Some state courts held that military retirement
payments constituted present income by categorizing retired pay as salary
that was paid monthly and earned by remaining a member of the armed
forces subject to recall to active duty.39 As such, retired pay was not con-
36. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
37. See supra note 24.
38. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 594; McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 236 (1981); His-
quierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 575 (1979); In re Marriage of Crook, 813 N.E.2d 198,
205-06 (I11. 2004); see also Hammerstrom, supra note 26, at 319.
39. See Watson v. Watson, 424 F. Supp. 866, 868-70 (E.D.N.C. 1976); Cose v. Cose,
592 P.2d 1230, 1231-32 (Alaska 1979), superseded by statute, Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 730 (1982), as recognized in Johnson
v. Johnson, 824 P.2d 1381, 1382-83 (Alaska 1992); Fenney v. Fenney, 537 S.W.2d 367, 367
(Ark. 1976); In re Marriage of Ellis, 538 P.2d 1347, 1349-50 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975), affd,
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sidered marital property.40 As a practical matter, however, most state
courts generally held that, to the extent that such benefits were acquired
during marriage, retired pay was an accrued property right earned by
years of service on active duty, much like private pension benefits, and,
therefore, constituted marital property that was subject to equitable dis-
tribution 41 or alimony. 42 Although some courts required that the retired
552 P.2d 506 (Colo. 1976); see also French v. French, 112 P.2d 235, 236-37 (Cal. 1941)
(holding that retainer pay compensation was for demands as member of the reserve, not a
pension for services already performed, and therefore, nonvested pensions-as mere ex-
pectancies-were not community property subject to distribution upon divorce), overruled
by In re Marriage of Brown, 544 P.2d 561, 562 (Cal. 1976). Brown disapproved of cases
relying on French and held nonvested pension rights not as expectancies, but as contingent
interests in property. Brown, 544 P.2d at 562-63. Brown held that the French rule "com-
pels an inequitable division of rights acquired through community effort." Id. at 562. The
husband in Brown agreed that the rule in French was inequitable but argued that the court
had discretion to offset that inequity with alimony. Id. at 567. The court said that a wife
"'should not be dependent on the discretion of the court ... to provide her with the
equivalent of what should be hers as a matter of absolute right."' Id. (omission in original)
(quoting In re Marriage of Peterson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 184, 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)).
40. See Cose, 592 P.2d at 1232; Fenney, 537 S.W.2d at 367; Ellis, 552 P.2d at 507.
41. See Neal v. Neal, 570 P.2d 758, 761 (Ariz. 1977) (holding that a military pension
earned during marriage is divisible as marital property); In re Marriage of Fithian, 517 P.2d
449, 451 (1974) (finding that a military pension is divisible if vested during the marriage,
even though it does not mature until later), abrogated by Brown, 544 P.2d at 562-63 (ruling
that contingent pension interest, whether vested or not, is property interest); Ramsey v.
Ramsey, 535 P.2d 53, 59 (Idaho 1975) (recognizing that military retired pay is divisible as
community or separate property, depending upon whether the service upon which it was
earned occurred before or during the marriage); In re Marriage of Musser, 388 N.E.2d
1289, 1291 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Swope v. Mitchell, 324 So. 2d 461, 464 (La. Ct. App. 1975)
(affirming division of military retired pay as community property); In re Marriage of
Weaver, 606 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (determining that military pensions are
marital property subject to division upon dissolution); In re Marriage of Miller, 609 P.2d
1185, 1187 (Mont. 1980) (holding that military retired pay is divisible as marital property),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Miller v. Miller, 453 U.S. 918 (1981) (remanding to Su-
preme Court of Montana for further consideration in light of intervening McCarty deci-
sion); Kruger v. Kruger, 375 A.2d 659, 663 (N.J. 1977); LeClert v. LeClert, 453 P.2d 755,
757 (N.M. 1969) (ruling that military pensions are divisible as community property); Mora
v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (characterizing the portion of military
retired pay earned during marriage as community property); Kirkham v. Kirkham, 335
S.W.2d 393, 394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Wilder v. Wilder, 534 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Wash. 1975)
(holding that nonvested pension is divisible); Payne v. Payne, 512 P.2d 736, 737-38 (Wash.
1973) (awarding the wife a portion of the husband's military pension, which would not
mature until one year after divorce decree); Kinne v. Kinne, 510 P.2d 814, 817 (Wash.
1973) (upholding property settlement agreement providing for monthly payments from
husband's military pension); Edwards v. Edwards, 444 P.2d 703, 704 (Wash. 1968); Morris
v. Morris, 419 P.2d 129, 130-31 (Wash. 1966) (finding that military pension is an asset ac-
quired during coverture); DeRevere v. DeRevere, 491 P.2d 249,252 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971)
(holding that the husband's contingent right to nonmatured pension should be considered
in making property division).
42. See, e.g., Kabaci v. Kabaci, 373 So. 2d 1144, 1146-47 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979) (allow-
ing military retirement benefits to be considered as a source from which to pay periodic
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pay be vested,43 most courts held that even nonvested pensions were
marital property.44
alimony but not alimony in gross or property settlement), overruled by Ex parte Vaughn,
634 So. 2d 533 (Ala. 1993) (holding that disposable military retirement benefits accumu-
lated during marriage are divisible as marital property); Andrews v. Andrews, 543 N.E.2d
31, 32 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (affirming alimony award from military retired pay, and not-
ing that it could have awarded the retired pay as property); Powers v. Powers, 465 So. 2d
1036, 1036-37 (Miss. 1985) (affirming award of permanent alimony equal to half of the
husband's military pension); Roach v. Roach, 432 P.2d 579, 581 (Wash. 1967) (determining
that federal military pension is income resource to be considered in fixing alimony).
43. See French, 112 P.2d at 236-37 (requiring certainty of receipt to be community
property); Williamson v. Williamson, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164, 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (requiring
certainty of receipt to be community property); Davis v. Davis, 495 S.W.2d 607, 613-14
(Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (denying the wife an interest in the husband's Air Force pension
rights because they had not yet vested); Miser v. Miser, 475 S.W.2d 597, 597, 600 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1971) (holding that an enlisted man serving eighteen years had vested pension right
that he was not eligible to receive until after twenty years).
Although courts would remain split on the issue of vesting, see infra note 45, some
courts after 1981 held that nonvested interests were not marital property. See, e.g., Burns
v. Bums, 847 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Ark. 1993) (determining that nonvested property is not divisi-
ble because it lacks "cash surrender value, loan value, redemption value, lump sum value,
and value realizable after death"); Durham v. Durham, 708 S.W.2d 618, 619 (Ark. 1986)
(holding that military retired pay is not divisible as marital property when military member
had not served at least twenty years at the time of the divorce because the pension was not
yet vested); Balderson v. Balderson, 896 P.2d 956, 960 (Idaho 1995) (noting that there is no
authority in USFSPA to award benefits before retirement); Griggs v. Griggs, 686 P.2d 68,
72 (Idaho 1984) (concluding that property accrued during marriage is marital property;
property awarded after divorce is separate property); Kirkman v. Kirkman, 555 N.E.2d
1293, 1294 (Ind. 1990) (excluding nonvested national guard pension from marital prop-
erty); Messenger v. Messenger, 827 P.2d 865, 867, 873-74 (Okla. 1992) (finding that only a
vested pension at the time of divorce is divisible).
44. See Van Loan v. Van Loan, 569 P.2d 214, 216 (Ariz. 1977) (holding that nonvested
military pension earned during marriage is divisible as marital property); Brown, 544 P.2d
at 562-63 (finding that pension interest is divisible community property, overruling, on this
point, Fithian, 517 P.2d at 457, which had held that military pension must vest during the
marriage to be divisible).
Many courts after 1981 would also hold that nonvested interests are marital property.
See, e.g., Laing v. Laing, 741 P.2d 649, 656 (Alaska 1987) (holding that nonvested retire-
ment benefits are divisible upon divorce); In re Marriage of Gallo, 752 P.2d 47, 54 (Colo.
1988) (overruling Ellis v. Ellis, 552 P.2d 506, 507 (Colo. 1976), which had held that retired
pay is not marital property or subject to division); In re Marriage of Jacobson, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 512, 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that "entitlement" does not mean actual re-
ceipt; rather, it means eligibility); In re Marriage of Riley-Cunningham, 7 P.3d 992, 994
(Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that nonvested interest is marital property); In re Marriage
of Beckman, 800 P.2d 1376, 1378-79 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that both vested and
nonvested military pensions are divisible as marital property); Memmolo v. Memmolo, 576
A.2d 181, 182 (Del. 1990) (concluding that pensions that accrue during marriage, whether
vested or not at the time of divorce, are marital property); Barbour v. Barbour, 464 A.2d
915, 919 (D.C. 1983) (suggesting, in dicta, that nonvested pensions are divisible as marital
property); In re Marriage of Korper, 475 N.E.2d 1333, 1336 (Il1. App. Ct. 1985) (finding
that pension is marital property, even if it is not vested); Poe v. Poe, 711 S.W.2d 849, 855
(Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (determining that nonvested military retirement benefits are marital
Military Disability Election
In 1979, an important parallel to the law regarding military retirement
benefits was the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hisquierdo,
in which the Court considered state court authority to distribute benefits
received under the Federal Railroad Retirement Act of 1974. 45 In His-
property); Little v. Little, 513 So. 2d 464, 469-70 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that non-
vested and nonmatured military retired pay is marital property); Ohm v. Ohm, 431 A.2d
1371, 1375 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (ruling that nonvested pensions are divisible);
Janssen v. Janssen, 331 N.W.2d 752, 754-56 (Minn. 1983) (holding that nonvested pensions
are divisible); Fairchild v. Fairchild, 747 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (determining
that nonvested and nonmatured military retired pay are marital property); Taylor v. Tay-
lor, 348 N.W.2d 887, 890 (Neb. 1984) (holding that nondisability military retired pay is
divisible); Forrest v. Forrest, 668 P.2d 275, 279 (Neb. 1983) (concluding that all retirement
benefits-whether vested and matured or not-are divisible marital property); Whitfield v.
Whitfield, 535 A.2d 986, 991-92 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (finding that nonvested
military retired pay is marital property); Damiano v. Damiano, 463 N.Y.S.2d 477, 481
(App. Div. 1983) (dividing nonvested pension); Delorey v. Delorey, 357 N.W.2d 488, 490
(N.D. 1984) (recognizing that nonvested property is marital); Bullock v. Bullock, 354
N.W.2d 904, 910 (N.D. 1984) (holding that nonvested military pension is divisible as mari-
tal property); Lemon v. Lemon, 537 N.E.2d 246, 249 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (ruling that
nonvested pensions are divisible as marital property); In re Marriage of Richardson, 769
P.2d 179, 184 (Or. 1989) (finding that nonvested pension plans are marital property); Ma-
jor v. Major, 518 A.2d 1267, 1270 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (concluding that nonvested military
retired pay is marital property); Tiffault v. Tiffault, 401 S.E.2d 157, 158 (S.C. 1991) (over-
ruling Brown v. Brown, 302 S.E.2d 860, 861 (1983), and finding that vested retired pay is
marital as compensation for past services as joint investment by both parties); Ball v. Ball,
430 S.E.2d 533, 535 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that nonvested military retirement bene-
fits are subject to equitable distribution); Caughron v. Caughron, 418 N.W.2d 791, 793
(S.D. 1988) (determining that present cash value of nonvested retirement benefit is marital
property); Towner v. Towner, 858 S.W.2d 888, 891-92 (Tenn. 1993) (approving separation
agreement dividing nonvested pension as marital property); Kendrick v. Kendrick, 902
S.W.2d 918, 926 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that nonvested military pension should be
valued and distributed using same principles as other public and private pensions, except
for limitations of USFSPA); Wilder v. Wilder, 534 P.2d 1355, 1357-58 (Wash. 1975) (hold-
ing nonvested pension to be divisible); DeRevere, 491 P.2d at 252 (determining that non-
vested retirement plan constitutes "property" divisible by court); Butcher v. Butcher, 357
S.E.2d 226, 230-31 (W. Va. 1987) (recognizing that vested and nonvested military retired
pay are both subject to equitable distribution); Parker v. Parker, 750 P.2d 1313, 1314-15
(Wyo. 1988) (finding that nonvested military retired pay is marital property).
45. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979). In Hisquierdo, the husband
and wife were married for fourteen years before separating. Id. at 577. During the mar-
riage, the husband worked for thirty years at various positions in the railroad industry and
was entitled to receive Railroad Retirement benefits. Id. at 578. The relevant portion of
the husband's Railroad Retirement benefits corresponded to what the husband would
have received if covered by the Social Security Act. Id. at 574-75. The wife, who also
worked during the marriage, was entitled to receive Social Security benefits. Id. at 579.
Although both parties agreed that the wife's expectation of Social Security benefits was
not divisible as community property, the wife claimed, under California law, an equal
marital interest in the husband's Railroad Retirement benefits. Id. at 578. The trial court
divided the parties' marital property but excluded from the divisible community property
the husband's expectation of receiving Railroad Retirement benefits. Id. at 572. The
Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that, because the benefits flowed from
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quierdo, the California Court of Appeal held that Congress had the
power to determine the characterization of federal pension benefits and
that, under the Federal Railroad Retirement Act, pension benefits were
the separate property of the retiree.46 Thus, a spouse had no community
property interest in railroad pension benefits upon divorce. There were
two bases for this holding. First, 45 U.S.C. § 231d(c)(3) provided that,
upon divorce, only the retiree held an interest in the pension benefits;
any interest of an employee's spouse in that property terminated upon
divorce.47 The court in Hisquierdo reasoned that, in providing for the
distribution of benefits, Congress fixed an amount that it believed was
appropriate to support the retiree in his or her old age and to encourage
the employee to retire.4 Any diminution of that interest by a former
spouse upon divorce would interfere with the scheme that Congress had
constructed under the Act.
Second, 45 U.S.C. § 231m, which prohibited the attachment and antici-
pation of benefits, assured that the retiree actually received the benefits
to which he or she was entitled, without subjecting the benefits to gar-
nishment from other legal processes. 49 Accordingly, benefits received
under the Act were the personal entitlement of the retiree, alone.
The Supreme Court of California reversed the court of appeal, how-
ever, by holding that the benefits derived from the Railroad Retirement
Act flowed from the marriage and, thus, were community property.5 The
court held that, by terminating a spouse's interest in benefits upon di-
vorce under § 231d(c)(3), Congress intended that those rights would then
be secured by state courts through the application of respective state
property distribution schemes.5 ' Further, the court held that, by awarding
compensatory property or offsetting with other marital property, it
"could avoid any infringement on the Act's designation of [the retiree] as
the 'individual' recipient.""
employment during the marriage, the benefits were community property and, thus, were
divisible upon divorce. Id. at 580 (citing In re Hisquierdo, 566 P.2d 224 (Cal. 1977)).
46. Id. at 579.
47. Id. at 584-85; see 45 U.S.C. § 231d(c)(3) (1976) ("The entitlement of a spouse of an
individual to an annuity.., shall end on the last day of the month preceding the month in
which... the spouse and the individual are absolutely divorced .....
48. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 585.
49. Id. at 583-84. The Court analogized the Railroad Retirement Act and the Social
Security Act and determined that, like 42 U.S.C. § 659(i)(3)(B)(ii) (enacted under the
Social Security Act), the Railroad Retirement Act provided a flat prohibition against the
attachment of benefits in other proceedings. Id. at 585-87.
50. Id. at 583.
51. Id. at 580.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 581. By offsetting with other property, the retiree still received all of the
retirement benefits to which he or she was entitled.
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However, the United States Supreme Court reversed the California
Supreme Court and held that benefits payable under the Railroad Re-
tirement Act may not be divided under state community property laws.-
The Court determined that preempting state law in the context of Rail-
road Retirement benefits "prevent[ed] the vagaries of state law from dis-
rupting the national scheme, and guarantee[d] a national uniformity that
enhance[d] the effectiveness of congressional policy." 5 In rejecting the
wife's argument that depriving her of the division of property to which
she contributed during the marriage was "manifestly unjust," the Court
held that the wife's argument was "a child of equity, not of law. 5 6 Alter-
natively, therefore, the wife claimed that the state court could compen-
sate for her nondistributable interest in the husband's benefits with other
property available for distribution, but the Court further held that state
courts may not award an offset for the expected value of the wife's inter-
est in the benefits. 7 In rejecting the wife's argument that offsetting Rail-
road Retirement benefits would provide equity without interfering with
the federal benefit scheme, the Court stated that:
An offsetting award.., would upset the statutory balance and
impair [the ex-spouse's] economic security just as surely as would
a regular deduction from his benefit check. The harm might well
be greater. [The Railroad Retirement Act] provides that pay-
ments are not to be "anticipated."... [A] prohibition against an-
ticipation is commonly understood to mean that "the interest of a
sole beneficiary shall not be paid to him before a certain date."
... If that definition is applied here, then the offsetting award ...
would improperly anticipate payment by allowing her to receive
her interest before the date Congress has set for any interest to
58
accrue.
The Court further held that offsetting "would frustrate the explicit and
detailed terms of the Act that grant the employee a benefit separate and
54. Id. at 591. The Court recognized, however, that such benefits were distributable
to satisfy alimony and child support awards. Id. at 586-87.
55. Id. at 584.
56. Id. at 586.
57. Id. at 588. But see In re Marriage of Milhan, 528 P.2d 1145, 1146-47 (Cal. 1974)
(allowing state court to offset with other property a spouse's interest in National Service
Life Insurance policy determined to be separate property since offset did not interfere with
federal objective of affording military spouse the absolute right to select beneficiary or
beneficiary's right to retain all proceeds from policy).
58. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 588-89. Significantly, in August 2006, Congress enacted
the Pension Protection Act of 2006, which expanded the marital property entitlement of
former spouses derived under the Act. See infra notes 280-86 and accompanying text. An
offset approach to military retirement benefits is consistent with this expansive view of the
marital interest of former spouses in pension and retirement benefits.
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distinct from the nonemployee spouse's benefit that terminates upon
absolute divorce."5 9 However, the Court added:
The approach must be practical. The federal nature of the
benefits does not by itself proscribe the entire field of state con-
trol.... The pertinent questions are whether the right as asserted
conflicts with the express terms of federal law and whether its
consequences sufficiently injure the objectives of the federal pro-
gram to require nonrecognition. 60
With respect to Railroad Retirement benefits, the Court in Hisquierdo
held that, by either directly distributing or offsetting benefits, state courts
did sufficiently injure federal objectives. Accordingly, federal law pre-
61empted state law in this context. With respect to military retirement
benefits, however, the Hisquierdo decision stood simply as a parallel con-
text.62 Despite Hisquierdo, many state courts held that military benefits
were community property and that Congress intended to rely on tradi-
tional state property distribution schemes to distribute such property.
63
Therefore, prior to 1981, federal law did not preempt state laws that per-
mitted the distribution of property interests in military retired pay.64
III. MCCARTY V. MCCARTY
Until 1981, state courts considering the distribution of military retire-
ment benefits were free to apply their respective statutory schemes for
the distribution of marital property upon the dissolution of marriage.
However, in 1981, the United States Supreme Court decided McCarty v.
McCarty.65 In McCarty, the Court relied on its decision in Hisquierdo and
held that the federal military retirement pay scheme at the time pre-
empted state community property laws and that, therefore, the Suprem-
acy Clause of the United States Constitution prohibited state courts from
distributing military retired pay upon the dissolution of marriage.
66
59. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 579-80.
60. Id. at 583.
61. Id. at 582. Subsequently, state courts considering the characterization and distri-
bution of Social Security benefits would rely on Hisquierdo, which drew parallels between
the Railroad Retirement Act and the Social Security Act. See supra note 49.
62. See Milhan, 528 P.2d at 1147. Federal law preempts state law in this area of the
law only when state law application interferes with the specific objectives of individual
federal statutes. Id. Thus, the federal nature of military retired pay does not necessarily
prohibit state courts from characterizing it as marital property or from applying state law
to equitably distribute marital property; state law is only preempted if the application of
state law frustrates federal objectives. Id. at 1146-47.
63. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Fithian, 517 P.2d 449,451,453 (Cal. 1974).
64. See In re Marriage of Miller, 609 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Mont. 1980) (holding that mili-
tary retired pay is divisible as marital property), vacated and remanded sub nom. Miller v.
Miller, 453 U.S. 918 (1981); see also Czarnecki v. Czarnecki, 600 P.2d 1098 (Ariz. 1979).
65. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
66. Id. at 218-21.
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In McCarty, Richard John McCarty and Patricia Ann McCarty were
married in 1957.67 After two years of marriage, the husband began active
duty in the United States Army.68 In December 1976, the husband filedfor " 69
for divorce. By that time, the husband had obtained the rank of colonel
and had served eighteen of the twenty years required to obtain retired
pay.70 In California-a community property state-the wife was entitled
71to one half of all property earned by either spouse during the marriage.
The wife claimed that the husband's military retired pay was part of the
marital property in which she had an interest; the husband claimed that
his retired pay was his separate property.
7 2
In November 1977, the Superior Court of California included the hus-
band's military pension and retirement rights as part of the quasi-
community property in which the wife held an interest and awarded her
approximately 45% of her proportionate share of that interest.73 The
husband sought review of this award.74 Distinguishing the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Hisquierdo,75 and instead relying on the Su-
preme Court of California's decision in In re Marriage of Fithian, in
which the court held that the application of California community prop-
erty law did not interfere in any way with the federal military retired pay
scheme,76 the California Court of Appeal held that the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution did not preclude the court from distrib-
uting the husband's military retired pay, and, therefore, affirmed the Su-
perior Court's award to the wife.77 The husband appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.8
The question for the United States Supreme Court in McCarty was
whether federal law prohibited "a state court from dividing military non-
disability retired pay pursuant to state community property laws." 79 Rec-




71. Id. at 217 (citing Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 577-78 (1979)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 218. Because the husband's pension had not yet vested at the time he filed
for divorce, the wife was awarded
"that portion of [the husband's] total monthly pension or retirement payment which
equals one-half (1/2) of the ratio of the total time between marriage and separation
during which [the husband] was in the United States Army to the total number of
years he has served with the ... Army at the time of retirement."
Id. (omission in original) (quoting the Superior Court's decision in McCarty).
74. Id.
75. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 572.
76. In re Marriage of Fithian, 517 P.2d 449, 453 (Cal. 1974).
77. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 218.
78. Id. at 219 n.12.
79. Id. at 211.
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ognizing that domestic relations issues historically are left to state courts,
the Court nevertheless held that federal law at the time preempted state
law and that the Supremacy Clause prohibited state courts from distribut-
ing military retired pay pursuant to their respective statutory distribution
schemesl There were several bases by which the McCarty Court
reached this decision. First, the Court compared the language and his-
tory of the military retirement scheme to the language and history of sev-
eral other federal benefit schemes, namely the Retired Serviceman's
Family Protection Plan (RSFPP)
8' and the Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP).2
Second, the Court compared the limitations of the military retirement
scheme to the broader scope of the Social Security Act," the Civil Service
Retirement Act (CSRA), 8 and the Foreign Service Act (FSA).85 Third,
the Court relied on its previous decision in Hisquierdo to analogize the
military retirement payment scheme to the payment scheme employed
under the Railroad Retirement Act.86 Finally, notwithstanding these rea-
sons, the Court in McCarty held that allowing state courts to distribute
federal military retirement benefits severely damaged the application of
the military retirement payment scheme; therefore, federal law pre-
empted state law and, under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution, state courts could not distribute federal retirement benefits
under their respective property distribution schemes.
87
1. The Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan and the Survivor
Benefit Plan
In McCarty, the Court compared the military retirement payment
scheme to the payment schemes under the RSFPP and the SBP. For ex-
ample, the RSFPP, established in 1953, allowed for the military member
to elect "to reduce his or her retired pay ... to provide [at death] an an-
nuity for the surviving spouse or children. 88 Participation in the plan was
80. Id. at 220, 232-35.
81. See id. at 226. See generally Uniformed Services Contingency Option Act of 1953,
Pub. L. No. 239,67 Stat. 501 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 1431-46 (2000)).
82. See McCarty, 453 U.S. at 226. See generally Act of Sept. 21, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
425, 86 Stat. 706 (1972) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447-55 (2000)).
83. See McCarty, 453 U.S. at 230. See generally Tax Reduction and Simplification Act
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 501(d), 91 Stat. 126, 159-61 (repealed 1996); Social Services
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2337, 2351-58 (1975) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 659 (2000)).
84. See McCarty, 453 U.S. at 230-32. See generally Act of Sept. 15, 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-366, § 1(a), 92 Stat. 600,600 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 83450)(1) (2000)).
85. See McCarty, 453 U.S. at 230-32. See generally Foreign Service Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-465, § 814, 94 Stat. 2071, 2113-16 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 4054
(2000)).
86. See McCarty, 453 U.S. at 226. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 231-231v (2000).
87. See McCarty, 453 U.S. at 234-36.
88. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 226; see 10 U.S.C. § 1434(a) (2000).
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voluntary, and any beneficiary election under the plan could be revoked
"to reflect a change in the marital or dependency status of the member or
his family that [was] caused by death, divorce, annulment, remarriage, or
acquisition of a child."89 Furthermore, "deductions from [the service per-
son's] retired pay automatically cease[d] upon the death or divorce of the
service [person's] spouse."90  Thus, the McCarty Court reasoned that
Congress intended the benefits paid under the RSFPP to be personal to
the service person and not subject to any interest of a spouse that was not
*authorized by the service person.91
Similarly, under the SBP, service members could provide, at death, an
annuity for spouses and children.9 Under the SBP, although annuity
payments did not automatically cease upon divorce, the benefits under
the plan were "not assignable or subject to execution, levy, attachment,
garnishment, or other legal process." 93  Furthermore, under both the
RSFPP and the SBP, the service member was free to elect no annuity for
a spouse and to retain all retired pay for himself or herself, or to elect an
annuity only for his or her children and not his or her spouse.94 The
McCarty Court reasoned that, if Congress intended retired pay to be
treated as community property, it would not have provided for a service
member to "deprive the spouse of his or her interest in the property" in
this manner.9' Instead, Congress intended that the decision to leave an
annuity be solely the decision of the service member.96 Thus, it seemed
clear that Congress intended benefits under the plans to be retained as
the personal entitlement of the service person and not subject to the in-
terest of a spouse. The Court analogized Congress' intent here to the
context of military retired pay and determined that Congress intended
military retired pay to be a personal entitlement of the military member
as well.97
89. 10 U.S.C. § 1431.
90. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 215; see 10 U.S.C. § 1434(c).
91. See McCarty, 453 U.S. at 226-27.
92. See id. at 226. The RSFPP provided for annuities that were financed by the ser-
vice person through significant reductions from retired pay, and, thus, "only about 15% of
eligible military retirees participated in the plan." Id. at 215. "Participation in [the SBP
was] automatic unless the service member" opted out, and the government made contribu-
tions to the annuities; thus, the SBP was "less expensive for the service member" and gen-
erated greater participation than the RSFPP. Id. at 215-16.
93. 10 U.S.C. § 1450(i). The RSFPP includes this same restrictive language. See 10
U.S.C. § 1440 (indicating that annuities are not subject to legal process).
94. See 10 U.S.C. § 1434 (RSFPP); 10 U.S.C. § 1450 (1976) (SBP).
95. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 226.
96. Id. at 227 & n.20.
97. Id. at 226-27.
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2. The Social Security Act, the Civil Service Retirement Act, and the
Foreign Service Act
The McCarty Court further reasoned that state court distribution of
military retired pay was contrary to federal law at the time because of the
anti-assignment provisions respecting military retired pay.98 "Congress
intended that military [retirement benefits] 'actually reach the benefici-
ary." ' 99 The McCarty Court explained that, "[i]n enacting the SBP, Con-
gress [had] rejected [proposed] provision[s] ... allow[ing] attachment of
up to 50% of military retired pay to comply with a court order in favor of
a spouse, former spouse, or child."'O Subsequently, however, in 1975,
Congress amended the Social Security Act to provide that all federal
benefits, including military retired pay, may be subject to legal process to
enforce child support or alimony obligations.) 1 In 1977, Congress re-
stricted the definition of "alimony" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 659(a) by
excluding from the term "any payment or transfer of property.., in com-
pliance with any community property settlement, equitable distribution
of property, or other division of property between spouses or former
spouses."' ° Thus, in an important distinction, Congress allowed for gar-
nishment of retired pay for the support of the family's needs, but not for
the settlement of property distribution claims.0 3 Indeed, Congress had
allowed for other retirement benefits to be subject to property distribu-
tion awards, but chose not to do so in this context. For example, Con-
gress had required that Civil Service Retirement benefits be paid to an
ex-spouse according to "the terms of any court order or court-approved
property settlement agreement incident to any court decree of divorce,
annulment, or legal separation."'04 Additionally, under the Foreign Ser-
vice Act, Congress provided that, as a matter of federal law, a former
spouse may be "entitled to a pro rata share of up to 50% of [a service
member's Foreign Service] retirement benefits."'0 5 Thus, under these
98. See id. at 228-29 & n.2 (referring to 37 U.S.C. § 701(c) (1976)).
99. Id. at 228 (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572,584 (1979)).
100. Id. at 228-29.
101. See Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88 Stat.
2337, 2351-58 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 659 (2000)); see also Rose v. Rose, 481
U.S. 619 (1987) (upholding the Tennessee court's authority over a military veteran for
failure to pay alimony and child support when disability pay was the only form of income
derived from retirement, finding that VA benefits were intended to take care of not just
the veteran; thus, a state court order to pay child support from disability benefits was not
preempted by federal law).
102. Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L No. 95-30, § 501(d), 91 Stat.
126, 159-61 (repealed 1996).
103. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 230-32 (relying on Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 587).
104. See Act of Sept. 15, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-366, § l(a), 92 Stat. 600, 600 (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 83450)(1) (2000)).
105. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 230-31. See generally Foreign Service Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-465, § 814, 94 Stat. 2071, 2113-16 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 4054 (2000)).
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programs, Congress had provided for state court authority over Civil Ser-
vice Retirement benefits and limited federal recognition of Foreign Ser-
vice benefits as community property. The McCarty Court reasoned,
however, that with respect to federal military retirement benefits, Con-
gress had enacted no such legislation °6 Instead, Congress continued to
view military retired pay as the personal entitlement of the service mem-
ber 1O
3. The Railroad Retirement Act and Hisquierdo
In Hisquierdo, the United States Supreme Court held that benefits un-
der the Federal Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 could not be distributed
as marital property or offset under state community property laws.1 8 In
considering Hisquierdo, the McCarty Court first recognized that, in His-
quierdo, the Railroad Retirement Act "included provisions establishing
'a specified beneficiary protected by a flat prohibition against attachment
and anticipation,' and a limited [recognition of] community property...
that terminated upon divorce."' °9 The wife in McCarty argued that there
were no such provisions in the military retirement context, and, thus,
Hisquierdo was inapposite." ° But the McCarty Court relied on its further
holding in Hisquierdo that, while domestic relations issues historically are
governed by state law, federal law will preempt state law if the applica-
tion of state law creates "major damage" to "clear and substantial" fed-
eral interests.' The Hisquierdo Court determined that application of
California's community property laws with respect to Railroad Retire-
ment benefits created such damage to federal interests.1 2 In assessing
whether subjecting military retired pay to state distribution provisions
sufficiently violated the federal retirement scheme, the McCarty Court
relied on its previous decision in Hisquierdo.
In McCarty, the husband argued that application of California's com-
munity property laws to federal military retirement benefits frustrated
the federal military retirement benefit scheme for two reasons. First, he
argued that California's community property laws recognized military
retired pay as "deferred compensation for services performed during the
marriage," whereas federal law treated "military retired pay ... [as] cur-
rent compensation for reduced, but currently rendered services [in re-
106. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 231-32.
107. See id.
108. See Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 587-90.
109. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 220 (quoting Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 582-85). Both of these
concepts have since been rejected by the enactment of the Pension Protection Act of 2006.
See infra notes 280-86 and accompanying text.
110. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 220.
111. See id. at 220; Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 581.
112. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 590.
2007]
Catholic University Law Review
tirement] earned after the dissolution of the marital community.""' 3
Thus, he argued that, under the federal payment scheme, military retired
pay must be characterized as separate property. 14 However, the McCarty
Court declined to decide that specific issue because it held that, regard-
less of how federal military retired pay was characterized, application of
state law concepts frustrated the federal military retirement scheme."5
First, it held that, unlike the Railroad Retirement Act considered in His-
quierdo, the federal military retirement scheme did not entitle a spouse
"to a separate annuity that terminated upon divorce" and, therefore, did
not employ any sort of community property concept to military retired
pay."6 Instead, it viewed retired pay purely as a personal entitlement of
the service member. 17 The Court found support for this in the fact that
"the service member may designate a beneficiary to receive any unpaid
arrearages in retired pay upon his [or her] death,""..8 and the designated
beneficiary may be someone other than the service member's spouse.19
Further, the Court recognized that the federal statute expressly provided
that "'[a] payment under this section bars recovery by any other person
of the amount paid.". 20 Significantly, the Court held that "'[i]f retired
pay were community property, the retiree could not thus summarily de-
prive his wife of her interest in the arrearage. ' '' 12' Thus, because the
Court accepted the view that military retirement benefits were not mari-
tal property but were the personal entitlement of the service member,
113. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 221. Reduced services in retirement refers to the fact that
retired officers remain members of the Armed Services
who may wear its uniform, whose names shall be borne upon its register, who may be
assigned by their superior officers to specified duties by detail as other officers are,
who are subject to the rules and articles of war, and may be tried, not by a jury, as
other citizens are, but by a military court-martial, for any breach of those rules, and
who may finally be dismissed on such trial from the service in disgrace.
Id. at 221-22 n.13 (quoting United States v. Tyler, 105 U.S. 244, 246 (1881)). The McCarty
Court further recognized that retired officers continue to be subject to the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, may forfeit all or part of their retired pay by engaging in certain enu-
merated activities, and remain subject to recall to active duty at any time. Id. at 221-22
nn.13-14.
114. Id. at 221.
115. Id. at 223.
116. Id. at 224.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 2771 (1976)).
119. Id. at 224-25.
120. Id. at 225 (alteration in original) (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 2771(d)).
121. Id. at 226 (quoting B. Abbott Goldberg, Is Armed Services Retired Pay Really
Community Property?, 48 CAL. B. J. 12, 17 (1973)). This observation is significant because
subsequently, the Court would hold that military retired pay is marital property; thus, even
under the reasoning of McCarty and Hisquierdo, a military spouse could not deprive the
spouse of his or her interest in that property.
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state law that viewed the benefits as divisible community property di-
rectly conflicted with the federal payment scheme.
In addition to this conflict, the Court held that the application of state
law concepts to federal military retirement benefits was sufficiently inju-
rious to the objectives of the federal program to be preempted .2  In so
holding, the Court recognized two primary objectives of the federal mili-
tary retirement payment scheme: "to provide for the retired service
member, and to meet the personnel management needs of the active mili-
tary forces."' 2
With respect to the first objective, the Court held that state community
property laws would reduce the amount of retired pay that Congress af-
forded solely to the retired member, and if a service member were sub-
ject to a reduction in retired pay, this "may disrupt the carefully balanced
scheme Congress ha[d] devised to encourage a service member to set
aside a portion of his or her retired pay as an annuity for a surviving
spouse or dependent children."' 24
Second, the Court held that the application of state law concepts dis-
rupted military personnel management.)' The Court recognized that
"the military retirement system is designed to serve as an inducement for
enlistment and re-enlistment, to create an orderly career path, and to
ensure 'youthful and vigorous' military forces.' ' 126 The Court's concern
was that military personnel, unlike civilian beneficiaries, are not free to
select their state of residence.' 27 "The value of retired pay as an induce-
ment for enlistment or re-enlistment is obviously diminished to the extent
that the service member recognizes that he or she may be involuntarily
transferred to a State that will divide that pay upon divorce."'u Thus, a
lack of uniformity among the states was a factor in the Court's reasoning.
Furthermore, the Court was concerned that, by reducing the retired pay
available to the service member, community property laws not only dis-
couraged retirement but offered an incentive for the aging service mem-
ber to continue serving on active duty, thereby frustrating the federal
objective of maintaining a "youthful and vigorous" military.
29
Thus, the Court held that, because the application of state community
property laws sufficiently frustrated federal interests and objectives, the
Supremacy Clause required that federal law preempt state law and pro-
hibited state courts from treating retired pay as distributable marital
122. Id. at 232.
123. Id. at 232-33.
124. Id. at 233.
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property.13 What was significant, however, was that the Court held that
it was not necessarily unconstitutional to allow for state law to apply, but
simply that federal law at the time did not allow for it. In fact, the
McCarty Court expressed its concern as to the effectiveness of the federal
payment scheme in accomplishing these specific objectives.' The Court
stated: "Of course, the questions whether the retirement system should
be amended so as better to accomplish its personnel management goals,
and whether those goals should be subordinated to the protection of the
service member's ex-spouse, are policy issues for Congress to decide.'
13 2
The Court specifically recognized that "the plight of an ex-spouse of a
retired service member is often a serious one," and furthermore, the
Court noted:
Congress may well decide, as it has in the Civil Service and For-
eign Service contexts, that more protection should be afforded a
former spouse of a retired service member. This decision, how-
ever, is for Congress alone .... [I]n no area has the Court ac-
corded Congress greater deference than in the conduct and con-
trol of military affairs. Thus, the conclusion that we reached in
Hisquierdo follows a fortiori here: Congress has weighed the mat-
ter, and "[i]t is not the province of state courts to strike a balance
different from the one Congress has struck.' 33
Thus, while the McCarty Court held that federal law at the time pre-
empted state property distribution laws with respect to military retired
pay, it left the door open for Congress to amend federal law in this area
to better protect former spouses of military retirees and allow for state
courts to include military retired pay in the division of marital property.
IV. THE UNIFORMED SERVICES FORMER SPOUSES PROTECrION Acr
In direct response to the McCarty decision, Congress enacted the
USFSPA, which specifically authorized state courts to treat as community
property "disposable retired or retainer pay."'13 Under the USFSPA, up
to 50% of disposable retired pay may be paid directly to former spouses
with state court orders awarding such pay. Congress specifically de-
fined disposable retired pay as "the total monthly retired or retainer pay
130. See id. at 235.
131. See id. at 234 & n.26. The Court referenced a Presidential Commission report that
questioned whether "the military retirement system actually accomplish[ed] these goals."
Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 235-36 (second alteration in original) (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,
439 U.S. 572, 590 (1979)) (citation omitted).
134. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1988). The text of the current version of § 1408(c)(1) is
provided supra note 13; see also supra note 12.




to which a member is entitled (other than the retired pay of a member
retired for disability).136  The USFSPA effectively superseded the
McCarty Court's prohibition of state court authority to dispose of mili-
tary retired pay according to respective state property distribution
schemes.
As a result of Congress' authorization for state court distribution of
military retired pay, many state courts acted to apply their state laws to
distribute military retired pay,"' while other state courts rekindled caselaw that effectively had been overruled by McCarty.13 8 For example, prior
136. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(B) (1988) (emphasis added), amended by National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 510, § 555(b), 104 Stat. 1485, 1569
(1990); see also McHugh v. McHugh, 861 P.2d 113, 114 n.2 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (recog-
nizing that "disposable retired pay" is total monthly retired or retainer pay minus amounts
owed to the United States or deducted); Keen v. Keen, 486 N.W.2d 105, 106 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992) (determining pension value for purposes of apportioning marital property, and
finding that "net pension" means disposable retired pay, as defined by the USFSPA).
137. See Chase v. Chase, 662 P.2d 944, 946 (Alaska 1983) (holding that the superior
court has discretion to consider military retired pay in the distribution of marital assets);
Casas v. Thompson, 720 P.2d 921, 925 (Cal. 1986); In re Marriage of Harrison, 769 P.2d
678, 680 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (overruling prior case law prohibiting division of military
retired pay); Campbell v. Campbell, 474 So. 2d 1339, 1341-42 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (finding
that a spouse is entitled to disposable retired pay, not gross retired pay, and not VA dis-
ability benefits paid in lieu of military retired pay); Lunt v. Lunt, 522 A.2d 1317, 1318 (Me.
1987) (ruling that a military pension is divisible); Powers v. Powers, 465 So. 2d 1036, 1037
(Miss. 1985) (determining that the USFSPA authorizes courts to divide military pension as
property); Moon v. Moon, 795 S.W.2d 511, 514 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that only
disposal retired pay is divisible); Coates v. Coates, 650 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983) (finding that the USFSPA nullified McCarty, and, therefore, military pension may be
divided as property); In re Marriage of Weaver, 606 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)
(ruling that military pensions are divisible marital property); In re Marriage of Kecskes,
683 P.2d 478, 480 (Mont. 1984) (holding that military retired pay is included in marital
estate); In re Marriage of Miller, 609 P.2d 1185, 1187 (Mont. 1980) (determining that mili-
tary retired pay is divisible as marital property), vacated and remanded sub nom. Miller v.
Miller, 453 U.S. 918 (1981); Majauskas v. Majauskas, 463 N.E.2d 15, 20-21 (N.Y. 1984)
(dividing a vested but nonmature pension); Lydick v. Lydick, 516 N.Y.S.2d 326, 327 (App.
Div. 1987) (finding that military pension is marital property); Gannon v. Gannon, 498
N.Y.S.2d 647, 649 (App. Div. 1986) (dividing military pension as marital property); Stokes
v. Stokes, 738 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Okla. 1987) (holding that military pension may be divided
as jointly acquired property); In re Marriage of Manners, 683 P.2d 134, 136 (Or. Ct. App.
1984) (finding that military pensions are divisible); Tiffault v. Tiffault, 401 S.E.2d 157, 158
(S.C. 1991) (characterizing vested military retirement benefits as subject to equitable dis-
tribution); Gibson v. Gibson, 437 N.W.2d 170, 171 (S.D. 1989) (determining that military
retired pay is divisible); Greene v. Greene, 751 P.2d 827, 831 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (hold-
ing that military retirement benefits accrued in whole or in part during the marriage are
marital property); Sawyer v. Sawyer, 335 S.E.2d 277, 280 (Va. Ct. App. 1985) (concluding
that military retired pay should be subject to equitable division); Konzen v. Konzen, 693
P.2d 97, 100 (Wash. 1985) (affirming division of military pension as property).
138. See Coates, 650 S.W.2d at 310; Miller, 609 P.2d at 1187 (retired pay is divisible as
marital property); Castiglioni v. Castiglioni, 471 A.2d 809 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1984);
Walentowski v. Walentowski, 672 P.2d 657, 659 (N.M. 1983) (reinstating the law under
LeClert v. LeClert, 453 P.2d 755, 757 (N.M. 1969), which held retired pay as divisible). But
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to 1981, Arizona had treated vested and nonvested retired pay as com-
munity property, to the extent that it was acquired during the marriage.9
McCarty effectively overruled this application of state law. As a result of
the USFSPA, however, the Supreme Court of Arizona, in De Gryse v. De
Gryse, resurrected former case law that authorized state distribution of
retired pay.' 4° In De Gryse, the superior court awarded to the wife, as
community property upon divorce, one-third of the husband's United
States Marine Corps military retired pay.' The husband requested that
the court modify the divorce decree in light of the McCarty decision. 1
42
However, the court noted that Congress had recently passed the
USFSPA and, as a result, held that case law in effect prior to McCarty
"once again govern[ed] the question of the division of military retirement
benefits upon divorce. '1 43 The court explained the effect of the USFSPA
on McCarty:
"The purpose of [10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1)] is to place the courts in
the same position that they were in on June 26, 1981, the date of
the McCarty decision, with respect to treatment of non-disability
military retired or retainer pay. The provision is intended to re-
move the federal pre-emption found to exist by the United States
Supreme Court and permit State and other courts of competent
jurisdiction to apply pertinent State or other laws in determining
whether military retired or retainer pay should be divisable [sic].
Nothing in this provision requires any division; it leaves that issue
up to the court applying community property, equitable distribu-
tion or other principles of marital property determination and
distribution. The power is returned to the courts retroactive to
June 26, 1981. This retroactive application will at least afford in-
dividuals who were divorced (or had decrees modified) during
the interim period between June 26, 1981 and the effective date
of this legislation the opportunity to return to the courts to take
advantage of this provision."'44
see Delucca Roman v. Colon Nieves, 119 P.R. Dec. 720, 728 (1987) (reestablishing retire-
ment as separate property, consistent with earlier decision in Maldonado v. Superior
Court, 100 P.R.R. 370 (1972), and overruling the earlier decision of Torres Reyes v. Robles
Estrada, 115 P.R. Dec. 765, 765 (1984), which held it as divisible); Carrero Quiles v. Santi-
ago Feliciano, 133 P.R. Dec. 727, 732 (1993) (citing Delucca with approval).
139. See Neal v. Neal, 570 P.2d 758, 761 (Ariz. 1977); Van Loan v. Van Loan, 569 P.2d
214, 216 (Ariz. 1977).
140. See De Gryse v. De Gryse, 661 P.2d 185, 187 (Ariz. 1983).
141. Id. at 186.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 187 (referring to Van Loan and Neal).
144. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-502, at 16 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1596,
1611); see also Edsall v. Superior Court, 693 P.2d 895, 898 (Ariz. 1984) (recognizing Con-
gress' intent to wipe out the effects of McCarty on persons divorced between McCarty and
the passage of the USFSPA); Berry v. Berry, 265 Cal. Rptr. 338, 341 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
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Similarly, in Idaho, prior to 1981, the court in Ramsey v. Ramsey held
that military retired pay was divisible as community property if the ser-
vice for which it was earned occurred during the marriage. In 1982,
after the McCarty decision, the court in Rice v. Rice overruled Ramsey by
holding that:
However much we may disagree with the decision in McCarty, we
are nevertheless bound to follow and apply it. Hence, we are re-
quired to overrule Ramsey v. Ramsey, insofar as it conflicts with
McCarty, and we reluctantly conclude in the instant case that
military retirement pay must be held to be the separate property
(finding that USFSPA was retroactively applicable so as to obliterate McCarty); In re
Marriage of Hopkins, 191 Cal. Rptr. 70, 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that the USFSPA
was applicable to cases not final on February 1, 1983, which was the effective date of the
USFSPA); In re Marriage of Frederick, 190 Cal. Rptr. 588, 590 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (stat-
ing that Congress' use in the USFSPA of retroactive application date of June 26, 1981- the
same date as McCarty decision-evidenced intent that military retirement pensions be
treated as though McCarty decision did not exist); Sherrill v. Sherrill, 639 So. 2d 794, 797
(La. Ct. App. 1994) (reasoning that Congress intended to apply USFSPA retroactively so
as to totally eliminate the effect of McCarty, even for decrees issued during the "window"
between McCarty and the enactment of the USFSPA); O'Connor v. O'Connor, 694 S.W.2d
152, 154 (Tex. App. 1985) (determining that the USFSPA reinstated state law as it existed
prior to McCarty); Neese v. Neese, 669 S.W.2d 388, 389 (Tex. App. 1984) (recognizing that
the purpose of the USFSPA was to reverse the effect of McCarty and to put courts in the
same position they were in before McCarty was decided); Konzen v. Konzen, 693 P.2d 97,
99 (Wash. 1985) (holding that the USFSPA was intended to apply retroactively to elimi-
nate the effects of McCarty). However, the effect was not to reopen divorce decrees issued
prior to McCarty that held that retired pay was not community property. But if such a
decree were issued after McCarty, the USFSPA's effect on McCarty would allow for a
court to subsequently treat the property as marital, even if it had not before. See In re
Marriage of Lyons, No. C034544, 2002 WL 1825437, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2002)
(holding that 1991 amendment to § 1408(c)(1) prohibits state courts from reopening pre-
McCarty cases in which "decrees neither divided military retirement pay nor reserved
jurisdiction to do so"); Hollyfield v. Hollyfield, 618 So. 2d 1303, 1305 (Miss. 1993) (finding
that the USFSPA did not apply retroactively to divorces finalized before June 25, 1981,
unless decree treated retired pay as marital property); Porter v. Porter, 542 N.W.2d 448,
450 (S.D. 1996) (holding that divorce decree may be reopened and the USFSPA may ret-
roactively apply where final decree entered subsequent to McCarty but prior to the
USFSPA); Trahan v. Trahan, 894 S.W.2d 113, 117-18 (Tex. App. 1995) (ruling that the
USFSPA retroactivity did not preempt common law doctrine of res judicata); Redus v.
Redus, 852 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. App. 1993) (concluding that the purpose of the USFSPA
was to prevent the reopening of divorce cases finalized before statute was enacted). But
see Kenny v. Kenny, 627 A.2d 426, 430 (Conn. 1993) (holding that state law regarding
retroactivity of the USFSPA is not preempted by federal law, but application of state law
may still prohibit state court from reopening and modifying decree); Morris v. Morris, 339
S.E.2d 424, 427 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that state law, which defines marital prop-
erty to include military pensions and which was enacted consequent to retroactivity of the
USFSPA, applies prospectively); Flannagan v. Flannagan, 709 P.2d 1247, 1253 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1985) (determining that a court may consider effect of reopening case on parties'
reliance on the finality of dissolution decree).
145. Ramsey v. Ramsey, 535 P.2d 53, 59 (Idaho 1975).
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of [the military spouse] and not subject to division between the
parties in this divorce action.14
After Congress enacted the USFSPA, however, the Supreme Court of
Idaho, in Griggs v. Griggs, reinstated Ramsey. 47 In Griggs, the husband
had served in the United States Air Force for 18 years during the mar-
riage.14' After being injured in Vietnam, he was declared disabled.' 49 At
the time of the divorce, the husband was receiving both retired and dis-
ability pay. The magistrate first determined that both forms of pay
were community property, but subsequently held the husband's disability
pay to be his separate property.15 ' The district court then reversed the
amended order and held that the disability pay was community prop-
erty.5 2 After the magistrate court and the district court rendered their
decisions, McCarty was decided, and the husband moved the Idaho Su-
preme Court to hold that his entire retired and disability pay was his
separate property.' Upon reconsideration, the district court held that
the husband's retired pay was community property but that his disability
pay was his separate property, based on the decision in McCarty."1 The
husband appealed from that order.
55
The court in Griggs recognized that it had already determined that the
USFSPA effectively overruled McCarty."5 The court stated that
"[b]ecause our holding [in Rice] was premised solely on the basis of
McCarty, which has been effectively overruled, we overrule Rice and re-
instate our holding in Ramsey as the law of Idaho.' ,
57
With respect to the husband's disability pay, however, the court held
that disability pay was indistinguishable in character from workmen's
compensation benefits, which it held to be payment for lost earning
power and, therefore, held that it was his separate property. 8 Although
the court recognized that this holding "may result in substantial injustice
in some cases," it was compelled to hold this way because of the resulting
146. Rice v. Rice, 645 P.2d 319,321 (Idaho 1982) (citation omitted).
147. Griggs v. Griggs, 686 P.2d 68, 71 (Idaho 1984).
148. Id. at 69.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 69-70.




155. Id. Although the district court held that only the issue of how to characterize the
husband's disability pay was raised on appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho exercised its
plenary authority to address that question. Id. While its decision did not affect the nature
of the characterization in that case, the court deemed the issue one of such import after the
McCarty decision that it needed to be addressed. Id. at 70 n.1.
156. Id. at 71 n.2 (citing Nieman v. Nieman, 673 P.2d 396 (Idaho 1983)).
157. Id. at 71.
158. Id. at 72 (citing Cook v. Cook, 637 P.2d 799, 801 (Idaho 1981)).
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tax benefits that Congress intended through the characterization of a
proportion of retired pay as disability pay.5 9 Thus, notwithstanding the
USFSPA's overruling of McCarty, there remained a clear distinction be-
tween how state courts would dispose of military retired pay and how
they would characterize and dispose of that portion of retired pay that
was waived for disability pay.
V. DISPARATE STATE COURT TREATMENT OF DISABILITY PAY UNDER
THE USFSPA
With the enactment of the USFSPA, Congress attempted to provide
uniformity among the states with respect to how military retired pay was
to be distributed upon divorce. However, state courts differed in their
respective interpretations of the USFSPA and varied with respect to
whether, in distributing retired pay upon divorce, they could consider the
retired pay that was waived for disability benefits.'6
Because, after the enactment of the USFSPA, states were again free to
apply their respective state property distribution laws, some courts, like
those in Puerto Rico, opted not to treat military retired pay as marital
property.16 ' For example, prior to McCarty in 1981, Puerto Rico treated
military retired pay as separate property. 62 After the USFSPA was en-
acted, the court in Torres Reyes v. Robles Estrada held that military re-
tired pay was divisible as marital property.' 63 However, in 1987, the court
in Delucca Roman v. Colon Nieves overruled Torres and, consistent with
pre-1981 case law, reestablished retirement pensions as separate prop-
erty.' 6 Thus, the USFSPA was not a mandate to treat retired pay as di-
visible marital property, but rather, it was an authorization for state
courts to apply their respective distribution schemes to such property,
regardless of how such property may be characterized. Pursuant to the
USFSPA, most state courts treated retired pay as marital property that
was subject to division upon divorce.' 6 The issue with which states dif-
fered in their interpretation of the USFSPA was whether a court could
159. Id. at 73.
160. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Fithian, 517 P.2d 449, 455 (Cal. 1974) ("Thus, a dis-
abled serviceman's option to receive a pension instead of retirement pay has no relevance
to the issue whether the states may treat either type of benefit as community property.").
161. See Delucca Roman v. Colon Nieves, 119 P.R. Dec. 720, 728 (1987); see also Car-
rero Quiles v. Santiago Feliciano, 133 P.R. Dec. 727, 732 (1993) (approving Delucca).
162. See Maldonado v. Superior Court, 100 P.R. Dec. 370, 376 (1972).
163. Torres Reyes v. Robles Estrada, 115 P.R. Dec. 765,766-67 (1984).
164. Delucca, 119 P.R. Dec. at 722-23; see also Carrero, 133 P.R. Dec. at 728 (approving
Delucca).
165. See, e.g., Stroshine v. Stroshine, 652 P.2d 1193, 1194 (N.M. 1982); In re Marriage of
Smith, 669 P.2d 448, 451 (Wash. 1983).
2007]
Catholic University Law Review
consider gross retired pay (which would include disability pay) when di-
viding property.' 66
Some courts provided that disability pay was distributable because it
was earned during coverture, just as retired pay was earned.67 For exam-
ple, the court in Stroshine v. Stroshine held that the fact that the property
in question was disability retirement funds did not prevent the state court
from dividing that asset if the spouse contributed to the marital commu-
nity's effort to acquire that property.'9 The court held that "McCarty
[did] not serve to upset the presumption that disability retirement pay is a
community property asset."' '  Instead, the court found that McCarty
"specifically restricted its holding only to military nondisability retire-
ment pay. ,
170
In Cameron v. Cameron, the court awarded the wife 35% of the hus-
band's gross retirement payments after the effective date of the
USFSPA."7' The parties in Cameron were divorced on March 29, 1979.172
Finding in 1982 that "[tihe purpose of the [USFSPA] was to reverse the
effect of the McCarty decision," the court awarded the wife her interest
in the husband's gross retired pay, but not during the period between
their divorce and the effective date of the USFSPA.
173
In Deliduka v. Deliduka, the court held that it could award a share of
gross retired pay to the former spouse because the scope of the USFSPA
simply limited the amount that the government could pay directly to the
spouse.'74 In Deliduka, the husband and wife were married for twenty-
three years .' During the marriage, the husband was an officer in the
United States Air Force and had a vested interest in a pension.7 6 The
166. See Beesley v. Beesley, 758 P.2d 695, 699 (Idaho 1988); Deliduka v. Deliduka, 347
N.W.2d 52, 55-56 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
167. See Stroshine, 652 P.2d at 1194 (holding that the disability portion of retired pay is
divisible community property because it was earned during coverture); see also White v.
White, 734 P.2d 1283, 1286-87 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (awarding a share of gross retired
pay).
168. Stroshine, 652 P.2d at 1194.
169. Id.
170. I&
171. Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. 1982).
172. Id. at 213.
173. Id. at 212-13; see also Grier v. Grier, 731 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Tex. 1987) (awarding a
share of gross retired pay, but holding that post-divorce pay increases constituted separate
property). But see Radigan v. Radigan, 465 N.W.2d 483, 487 (S.D. 1991) (ruling that the
husband must share with the wife any increase in retired benefits resulting from his own
post-divorce efforts).
174. Deliduka v. Deliduka, 347 N.W.2d 52, 55-56 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that a
court may award share of gross retired pay); see also White v. White, 734 P.2d 1283, 1286-
87 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (awarding a share of gross retired pay).




trial court awarded the wife 50% of the gross pension.' 7 The husband
argued that 10 U.S.C. § 1408 authorized payment of only disposable re-
tired pay, which is gross pay minus authorized deductions.17 However,
the court held that § 1408(c) "grants states the authority to treat all dis-
posable retired pay as marital property,... but limits direct government
payments to former spouses to 50 percent of disposable retired pay.' 79
Thus, if a state court chose to do so, it could award 50% of a retiree's
gross retired pay by limiting the amount received directly from the gov-
ernment to 50% of disposable pay'O and awarding nondisposable pay (or
the difference between gross retired pay and disposable retired pay)
through the distribution of other marital property in the dissolution pro-
ceedings.
181
Other courts held that, although retired pay was distributable as com-
munity property, a spouse was not entitled to an interest in gross retired
pay, but rather only disposable pay. 2 Thus, even after the USFSPA,
there was a clear lack of uniformity among state courts with respect to
the distribution of disability pay.
VI. MANSELL V. MANSELL
To clarify the lack of uniformity in the application of the USFSPA, in
1989, the United States Supreme Court decided Mansell v. Mansell.'8 In
Mansell, the husband "received both Air Force retirement pay and, pur-
suant to a waiver of a portion of that pay, disability benefits."' The par-
ties entered into a pre-McCarty property settlement agreement, which
provided, in part, that the husband would pay to his former wife 50% of
his total military retired pay, including that portion that was waived to
receive disability benefits.'8 5 The parties were divorced in 1979, and the
divorce decree incorporated the parties' property settlement agree-
ment.' 6
177. Id.
178. Id. at 55. The federal government will make direct payments to a former spouse,
up to 50% of disposable retired pay, provided the former spouse was married to the mili-
tary member "for a period of 10 years or more during which the member performed at
least 10 years of service creditable in determining the member's eligibility for retired pay."
10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(2), (e)(1) (2000).
179. Deliduka, 347 N.W.2d at 55 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c) (1982)).
180. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (e)(1) (2000).
181. Deliduka, 347 N.W.2d at 54.
182. See Beesley v. Beesley, 758 P.2d 695, 699 (Idaho 1988) (suggesting that the 50%
limit in § 1408 is not a limit on direct payment by the government, but is a limit on the total
receipt by the spouse); In re Marriage of Smith, 669 P.2d 448,451 (Wash. 1983).
183. Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581,583 (1989).
184. Id. at 585.
185. Id. at 585-86.
186. Id.
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In 1983, after the adoption of the USFSPA, the husband petitioned the
Superior Court of California to modify the divorce decree by removing
the provision that required him to share his total retired pay."7 The supe-
rior court denied his request.'8 The husband appealed to the California
Court of Appeal, claiming that the Act and the anti-attachment clause
that protects a veteran's receipt of disability benefits' 89 precluded the
court from treating waived military retired pay as community property.'9°
The court of appeal rejected his argument. 9' The husband petitioned the
Supreme Court of California for review, but the court denied his peti-
tion.'9 The husband then appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
which reversed the court of appeal's decision and held that the USFSPA
does not grant state courts the power to treat as marital property divisible
upon divorce the portion of military retired pay that is waived to receive
disability benefits.19
The Court recognized that, historically, when Congress passes general
legislation, it "rarely intends to displace state authority" to decide issues
within the domestic relations area. 94 But the Court said that this was one
of the "rare instances where Congress had directly and specifically legis-
lated in the area of domestic relations."' ' The Court said that it is clear,
by the language of the USFSPA and by legislative history that Congress
intended to "change the legal landscape created by the McCarty deci-
sion."' The wife claimed that the USFSPA completely restored to states
the pre-McCarty power to distribute retired pay; the husband claimed
that the Act was only a partial rejection of McCarty. 7
The Supreme Court held that § 1408(c)(1) affirmatively granted state
authority to divide military retired pay, but further held that the "lan-
187. Id. at 586.
188. Id.
189. See 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1) (Supp. III 2004). The anti-attachment clause provides
that veterans' benefits "shall not be assignable except to the extent specifically authorized
by law, and ... shall be exempt from the claim[s] of creditors, and shall not be liable to
attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either
before or after receipt by the [veteran]." Id.
190. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 586. Because the Court in Mansell held that the Act pre-
cluded states from treating as community property waived retired pay, it did not decide the
anti-attachment clause issue. Id. at 587 n.6.
191. Id. at 586.
192. Id. at 587.
193. Id. at 583.
194. Id. at 587 (citing Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619,628 (1987); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,
439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979)).
195. Id.
196. Id. The Court further noted that it was not by coincidence that Congress chose
June 25, 1981-the day before the McCarty decision-as the applicable date for the perti-
nent provisions of the Act. Id. at 588 n.7.
197. Id. at 588.
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guage was both precise and limited. '1 98 The language was precise in pro-
viding that "'a court may treat disposable retired or retainer pay ... ei-
ther as property solely of the member or as property of the member and
his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court."' 199
But the USFSPA limited disposable retired pay by excluding military
retired pay waived to receive disability benefits.20° Thus, the Court in
Mansell held that the plain language of the USFSPA allowed state courts
to treat only disposable retired pay as community property, not total re-
tired pay.20 1
In so holding, the Court observed:
We realize that reading the statute literally may inflict eco-
nomic harm on many former spouses. But we decline to misread
the statute in order to reach a sympathetic result when such a
reading requires us to do violence to the plain language of the
statute and to ignore much of the legislative history. Congress
chose the language that requires us to decide as we do, and Con-
gress is free to change it.2°2
Thus, after Mansell, state court authority to directly distribute military
retired pay under state property law was limited to disposable retired
pay, exclusive of that portion of retired pay waived to receive disability
pay.
VII. STATE COURT RESPONSES TO MANSELL: A LACK OF UNIFORMITY
Despite Congress' effort through the USFSPA to define the scope of
state court authority to distribute military retired pay, and despite the
United States Supreme Court's effort to clarify the scope of that author-
ity, state courts after Mansell continue to vary in their interpretation of
the USFSPA and, more specifically, in determining to what extent dis-
ability pay may be considered in distributing marital property. Many
state courts hold that, although Mansell prohibited the direct distribution
of disability pay as marital property, disability pay may still be considered
under state equity provisions by offsetting with other marital property
that portion of retired pay that is waived for disability pay, provided
there is not a direct offset.2 3 Other courts expressly provide that the dis-
tinction between direct and indirect offsetting is meaningless and, there-
198. Id.
199. Id. at 588-89 (omission in original) (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (1982)).
200. Id. at 589 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (a)(4)(B) (1982)).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 594.
203. See, e.g., Kelly v. Kelly, 9 P.3d 1046, 1048-49 (Ariz. 2000); see also Sellers v. Sell-
ers, No. E2005-02867-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 2567517, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App., Sept. 7,
2006) (rejecting alimony claim to make up for reduction due to disability election but ac-
knowledging that relief is possible through property award).
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fore, "considering" disability pay, which is separate property, by offset-
ting with marital property, is specifically prohibited.2 '
1. Considering Offsetting in Other Federal Benefit Contexts
A. Social Security
When the Court in McCarty considered the divisibility of federal bene-
fits in the military retirement context, it relied on its prior decision in
Hisquierdo, in which it held that state courts may not directly distribute
or offset benefits derived under the Railroad Retirement Act.25 The
Hisquierdo Court found relevant analogies between the Railroad Re-
tirement Act and the Social Security Act.20 6 Likewise, in considering the
issue of offsetting, the Social Security context is a significant parallel for
courts considering offsetting military disability benefits. But the United
States Supreme Court has not addressed specifically whether a state court
can indirectly offset or otherwise consider the parties' respective Social
Security benefits in dividing marital property. And there is significant
disparity among state courts with respect to whether state courts have the
authority to consider disproportionate Social Security benefits in the dis-
tribution of marital property by offsetting that property with other distri-
butable marital property. The disparity in this context stems from the
applicability of Hisquierdo. State courts that prohibit offsetting of Social
Security benefits rely on the decision in Hisquierdo;2 7 state courts that
allow Social Security benefits to be offset with other marital property find
Hisquierdo to be inapposite.0 8
204. See supra note 26.
205. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572,590 (1979).
206. Id. at 575-76. The Court noted the similarities between Railroad Retirement
benefits and Social Security benefits, specifically that the Railroad Retirement Act and
Social Security Act expressly prohibited the assignment of benefits through legal process
such as garnishment and attachment. Id. The Court said that Congress made an exception
for support and alimony out of concern for spouses and children. Id. at 576. But the Social
Security Act specifically provided that alimony "does not include any payment or transfer
of property or its value by an individual to his spouse or former spouse in compliance with
any community property settlement, equitable distribution of property, or other division of
property between spouses or former spouses." Id at 577 (quoting Tax Reduction and
Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 501(d), 91 Stat. 126, 160). Thus, "[t]he
Social Security Act provides a specific limited avenue for divorced persons to obtain a
share of the former spouse's benefits." Webster v. Webster, 716 N.W.2d 47, 55 (Neb. 2006)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 402 (b)(1)(A)-(D), (c)(1)(A)-(D) (2000)).
207. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Boyer, 538 N.W.2d 293, 294-95 (Iowa 1995); Olson v.
Olson, 445 N.W.2d 1, 7 (N.D. 1989).
208. See, e.g., Boyer, 538 N.W.2d at 296 (examining Social Security benefits in arriving
at an equitable distribution of marital assets); In re Marriage of Brane, 908 P.2d 625, 628
(Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that although anti-assignment clause of Social Security Act
precludes trial court from dividing Social Security income, court may consider Social Secu-
rity income when dividing marital property); Pongonis v. Pongonis, 606 A.2d 1055, 1058
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For example, in Webster v. Webster, the Supreme Court of Nebraska
held that the anti-assignment clause of the Social Security Act and the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution prohibit a direct
offset to adjust for disproportionate Social Security benefits between
spouses upon divorce.2° In Webster, the trial court awarded 50% of the
marital portion of the wife's employee retirement trust fund to the hus-
band.1 The court awarded the wife 50% of the husband's retirement
plan as well.2 ' The husband did not contribute to Social Security during
his employment, and, thus, all of his pension was divisible as marital
212property. But the wife regularly contributed to Social Security, the
benefits from which are considered separate property.213 Thus, despite
his contribution during the marriage, the husband's half interest in his
wife's retirement was exclusive of that portion used to derive the wife's
separate property Social Security benefits.214 Furthermore, the husband
(Me. 1992) (considering anticipated Social Security benefit as a relevant factor in dividing
marital property); Pleasant v. Pleasant, 632 A.2d 202, 206-07 n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993)
(ruling that Social Security benefits are not subject to direct distribution in a divorce pro-
ceeding; however, in certain situations, "it may be that a court could consider the fact that
a party is receiving, or will receive, social security benefits, as 'any other factor' in deter-
mining whether to make a monetary award"); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 681 N.E.2d 852, 856-
57 (Mass. 1997) (concluding that a court could consider anticipated Social Security benefits
as a factor in determining an equitable distribution of marital assets); Rudden v. Rudden,
765 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that while unassignable as marital or
separate property, current or potential Social Security "benefits are economic factors to be
considered" in disposition of marital property); Eickelberger v. Eickelberger, 638 N.E.2d
130, 134-35 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (determining that although future Social Security benefit
cannot be divided as a marital asset, it must be evaluated and considered by the trial court
in effecting an equitable distribution of the parties' marital assets); Holland v. Holland, 588
A.2d 58, 60 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (finding that the divorce court properly considered po-
tential Social Security benefits when awarding portion of future government pension); In
re Marriage of Zahm, 978 P.2d 498, 502-03 (Wash. 1999) (considering Social Security bene-
fits for purposes of making equitable distribution of property); see also Walker v. Walker,
677 N.E.2d 1252, 1253 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). But see Jones v. Jones, 780 P.2d 581, 584
(Haw. Ct. App. 1989) (comparing Hisquierdo and holding that a state court that distributes
property may not "change ... disability pay into retirement or some other kind of pay" or
penalize a person for making such a waiver; however, the court found that federal law does
not preclude state courts, when dividing property in a divorce case, from considering as
one of the relevant circumstances governing division of property a party's right to receive
disability pay "in the same way that a family court considers each party's ability or lack of
ability to earn and receive income post divorce"); Bewley v. Bewley, 780 P.2d 596, 598
(Idaho Ct. App. 1989) (finding Hisquierdo to be controlling, but nevertheless allowing a
partial offset of disability benefits via unequal distribution of other marital assets based on
"bona fide considerations other than dissatisfaction with the federal scheme").
209. Webster, 716 N.W.2d at 55-56.
210. Id. at 49.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 49-51.
213. Id. at 49, 56.
214. See id. at 50, 56.
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retired early and was in "pay status," whereas the wife continued to work
and did not yet receive any monthly payments.215 Accordingly, the wife
was entitled to $1,121.24 of the husband's monthly pension payment, and
had the wife been receiving pension payments, the husband would have
been entitled to $527 per month of the wife's pension-a difference of
approximately $594216 The husband argued that he should be able to
offset the inequity attributable to the difference in Social Security bene-
fits received by the parties. 7
The court reasoned that "[u]nder 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2000), the trans-
fer or assignment of Social Security benefits is forbidden. ''211 Sections
659(a) and 659(i)(3)(B)(ii) specifically exclude from the child support
and alimony exceptions to § 407 "payment obligations arising from a
community property settlement, equitable distribution of property, or
other division of property between spouses or former spouses., 219 But
what the husband wanted was not a direct division of the wife's nondi-
visible Social Security benefits, but rather an indirect "offset" of the
wife's marital share of his "pension by an amount reflecting the marital
share of the difference between [his] spousal share of [the wife's] Social
Security and [her] share of her Social Security benefit." 220 In other words,
the husband claimed that their shares of Social Security should be equal-
ized by awarding him half of the difference between what the wife de-
rived from her Social Security and what he derived from her Social Secu-
rity.
The court in Webster held that offsetting Social Security is prohibited
by the anti-assignment clause of the Social Security Act and the Suprem-
acy Clause of the United States Constitution.2' Although many courts,
particularly in equitable distribution states, have taken a more general-
ized consideration of Social Security benefits as a factor in making a
property division upon divorce (i.e., they consider such benefits in the
application of their respective state property distribution schemes),222
215. Id. at 51.
216. Id. at 50.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 53-54; see also In re Marriage of Crook, 813 N.E.2d 198, 201 (I11. 2004). The
court in Webster noted that "[c]ourts generally agree that [42 U.S.C.] § 407(a) preempts
state law that would authorize distribution of Social Security benefits, and that Social Se-
curity benefits themselves are not subject to... division." Webster, 716 N.W.2d at 53-54
(citing Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 417 (1973)) (discussing § 407).
219. Webster, 716 N.W.2d at 54.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 56.
222. See id. at 55 (citing In re Marriage of Morehouse, 121 P.3d 264 (Colo. App. 2005);
see also In re Marriage of Boyer, 538 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1995); In re Marriage of
Brane, 908 P.2d 625, 626 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995); Bradbury v. Bradbury, 893 A.2d 607, 609
(Me. 2006); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 681 N.E.2d 852, 856-57 (Mass. 1997); Rudden v. Rud-
den, 765 S.W.2d 719, 720 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Neville v. Neville, 791 N.E.2d 434, 437
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other courts have held that the distinction between equitable distribution
and a specific calculation with an offset is meaningless.
For example, the court in In re Marriage of Crook stated:
Instructing a trial court to "consider" Social Security benefits...
either causes an actual difference in the asset distribution or it
does not. If it does not, then the "consideration" is essentially
without meaning. If it does, then the monetary value of the So-
cial Security benefits the spouse would have received is taken
away from that spouse and given to the other spouse to compen-
sate for the anticipated difference. This works an offset meant to
equalize the property distribution.2 4
Under the reasoning of Hisquierdo, this offsetting is held to be improper
because it diminishes the value of property that was intended by Con-
gress to be the personal entitlement of the recipient.tm Thus, some courts
hold that state courts may not transform separate property disability pay
into marital property to cause such a diminution.m  As stated by the
court in Wolff v. Wolff, "[c]alling a duck a horse does not change the fact
that it is still a duck. 'Considering' [the spouse's] social security benefits
does not change the fact that this is still an offset, and therefore, error."27
However, other courts take a different view of offsetting under the the-
ory that "just because a horse might walk like a duck does not mean it is
one." That is to say that a state court's offset of other marital property,
through the application of its respective equitable distribution provisions,
does not necessarily mean that separate property disability pay is being
transformed into marital property to be distributed. Indeed, by offsetting
other marital property, actual disability pay is still being distributed only
to the military retiree-the party intended by Congress to receive the
(Ohio 2003) (holding that "benefits may be considered ... under the catchall category as a
relevant and equitable factor in making an equitable distribution," especially when a
spouse's benefits have been increased due to the work of the other spouse and the non-
employed spouse loses spending power after a divorce through the inability to use the
other spouse's benefits); In re Marriage of Zahm, 978 P.2d 498, 502 (Wash. 1999) (finding
that if there is not a specific calculation and offset, then Hisquierdo does not apply; anti-
assignment clause did not preclude consideration of Social Security benefits "within the
more elastic parameters of the court's power to formulate a just and equitable division of
the parties' marital property").
223. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hillerman, 167 Cal. Rptr. 240, 243-46 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980); In re Marriage of Crook, 813 N.E.2d 198, 204-05 (Ill. 2004); Webster, 716 N.W.2d at
56 (citing Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1994)); Wolff v. Wolff, 929 P.2d 916, 921 (Nev.
1996); English v. English, 879 P.2d 802, 807-08 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); Olson v. Olson, 445
N.W.2d 1, 7 (N.D. 1989); In re Marriage of Swan, 720 P.2d 747, 749 (Or. 1986); Reymann v.
Reymann, 919 S.W.2d 615,616-17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).
224. Crook, 813 N.E.2d at 205.
225. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 590 (1979).
226. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 780 P.2d 581, 584 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989).
227. Wolff, 929 P.2d at 921.
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pay. Allocating to the former spouse the value of the retired pay that was
waived to obtain the disability pay, to which the former spouse would
have been entitled absent the waiver, allows the court to put the parties
in a position with respect to their interest in retired pay similar to the
position they were in prior to the waiver. Congress has never expressly
provided that a marital or community entitlement to retirement benefits,
once accrued by a spouse during the marriage, should be subject to a uni-
lateral transformation into the separate property of the other spouse
without compensation.m Although, in its effort to accomplish specific
federal objectives, Congress provided for just such a transformation by
providing for disability waiver in 38 U.S.C. § 5305, and although Congress
set limitations on the distribution of that property through the USFSPA,
Congress also provided a means for state courts to remedy any inequity
resulting from the waiver. Congress intended the means for providing
such equity to be the state court's authority to distribute disposable re-
tired pay with other marital property.2 9
Although several courts have held that the restrictions of Mansell in
limiting state court authority to dispose of disability benefits cannot be
circumvented by offsetting,2 these cases rely on the reasoning of the
Court in Hisquierdo, which concerned itself with the "conflict between
federal and state rules for the allocation of a federal entitlement"231 but
took the view of that entitlement as a personal one belonging solely to
the military spouse. Other courts, which now view retired pay as a com-
munity entitlement in which the former spouse has accrued an equal in-
terest, find reliance on Hisquierdo to be inapposite. 2  With respect to
offsetting, courts distinguish Hisquierdo because, by offsetting with other
marital property, state courts are not allocating the federal entitlement-
they are allocating other marital property, over which Congress has never
restricted state court authority. In fact, Congress has already expressly
provided for it.
For example, in Kelly v. Kelly, the husband and wife were married in
1984 and divorced in 1997. 3' During the marriage, both were employed
228. One court has noted:
[A]n employee has a vested right with respect to pension benefits from the date of his
employment, where a pension plan is in effect and is part of the compensation which
he earns, and ... this right cannot be altered by the legislative body to his disadvan-
tage unless the change is accompanied by corresponding advantages.
Wilder v. Wilder, 534 P.2d 1355, 1357-58 (Wash. 1975) (supporting offsetting).
229. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (c)(1) (2000).
230. See, e.g., Jones, 780 P.2d at 584; Mosier v. Mosier, 830 P.2d 1175, 1177 (Idaho
1992); Walborn v. Walborn, 817 P.2d 160, 164-65 (Idaho 1991); Bewley v. Bewley, 780 P.2d
596,597 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989).
231. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572,582 (1979) (emphasis added).
232. See supra note 208.
233. Kelly v. Kelly, 9 P.3d 1046, 1047 (Ariz. 2000).
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by the federal government.23 The wife participated in the Federal Em-
ployees Retirement System, which included a Social Security compo-
nent.'35 The husband, however, participated in the Civil Service Retire-
ment System (CSRS), which did not participate in Social Security.23
Thus, the husband's entire pension benefit package was considered mari-
tal property for purposes of distribution.7 However, federal law prohib-
its state courts from dividing Social Security]m Thus, since federal law
prohibited the division of the wife's Social Security portion of her pension
benefits, the husband motioned the court "to consider a portion of his
CSRS benefits as separate property in order to compensate for the ineq-
uity."39
Relying on Van Loan v. Van Loan,24° the court held that, as a form of
deferred compensation for services rendered during the marriage, the
portion of retirement benefits earned during the marriage may be divided
as community property.41  Like military retirement benefits, the court
held that Social Security "would ordinarily be considered community
property under state law principles," but federal law prohibiting the gar-
nishment of these benefits prevented this application.4 2 The court held
Social Security to be the separate property of the participating spouse.2 43
The CSRS, however, allowed the court to treat benefits under that plan
as marital or community property244 and provided an exception to the
garnishment prohibition for "'any court order or court-approved prop-
erty settlement agreement incident to any court decree of divorce, an-
nulment, or legal separation. ' ' 2'
Thus, the court held that an inequity resulted from the fact that a por-
tion of the wife's salary was paid into the Social Security system, and that
salary was community property in which the husband held an interest.2
The resulting benefit from that contribution, but for federal law, would
be divisible as community property. But under the federal scheme, those
benefits were to be enjoyed only by the wife. Thus, "'[t]o the extent indi-
viduals with Social Security benefits enjoy an exemption of that 'asset'





238. 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2000).
239. Kelly, 9 P.3d at 1047.
240. 569 P.2d 214 (Ariz. 1977).
241. Kelly, 9 P.3d at 1047.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. (citing Act of Sept. 15, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-366, 92 Stat. 600).
245. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 8345(j)(1)(A) (1996)).
246. Id. at 1048.
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CSRS must. likewise, he so positioned.-'"''  The court summarized by
stating that "comunnity funds have been diverted to the separate blenefit
of one spouse ... I. rhis situation compels an equitable response. " " 'I he
equitable response afforded by the court in Kelly was to set aside as the
husband's separate property a portion of the husband's retirement fund,
which was distributable marital property, just as was done with Social
Security benefits for the wifer. Thus, the court treated both spouses as if




What distinguishes the offsetting that was prohibited in ilisquierdo
from the distribution allowed in cases like Kelly is the nature of the prop-
crty from which the offsetting award is derived. In llisquierdo, the prop-
city from which the disallowed offsetting award was derived was not
marital property that the state court was authorized to distribute; it was
property on which the federal payment scheme placed hitations7' But
in Kelly, the court was not dividing or directly offsetting Social Security





251.See lisquierdo v. 1squierdo, 439 U.S. 5712, 58 89 (1979) (relying on the anti
attachment clause piohibiting the anticipation of bcnefits); see also Kelly, 9 P.3d at 1049
(citing Wolff v. Wolff, 929 P.2d 916, 921 (Nev, 199); Olson v. ()lso, 445 N.W.2d 1, I1
(NID. 1989); bI re Mariiage of Swan, 720 P.2d 747, 751 (O. 1986)). In each of the eases
cited in Kelly, the; coints relied on liquierdo to hold that Social Security cannot e di-
vided in any way. hl.
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benefits or any other benefits limited by the federal payment scheme. 2
Instead, the court devalued marital property (Box B) to attribute it to the
husband as his separate property (Box Bi), just as the federal scheme
had done with the wife's Social Security benefits (Box A).253 If the hus-
band had no similar pension that could be devalued, there would be no
difference in devaluing other marital property to be set aside or offset to
the husband (Box C). The Kelly court held that such a distribution did
not violate Hisquierdo.24
Similarly, in Panetta v. Panetta, the court allowed an offset of dispro-
portionate Social Security benefits to balance the retirement benefits
accrued by each party during the marriage25' In Panetta, the parties were
256married in 1958 and divorced in 1994 . The parties executed a qualified
domestic relations order (QDRO) for the distribution of their respective
pensions. 7 The husband was employed by the federal government from
1977 to 2000.28 The husband participated in the federal civil service em-
ployees' pension system, through which he did not contribute to or re-
ceive Social Security benefits.2 9 The wife participated in a private pen-
sion, through which she did contribute to and receive Social Security
benefits. 260 The judgment of divorce provided:
[T]he evaluation of [the husband's] pension reflects an adjust-
ment for imputed social security benefits, as it is a civil service
pension. This reduced valuation shall be utilized for division of
[the husband's] pension and the applicable Qualified Domestic
Relations Order unless New Jersey Courts dictate law to the con-
trary prior to [the husband's] retirement.'
Subsequently, the court entered an amended judgment, which provided
that, upon the husband's retirement, the wife's portion of the husband's
pension benefits would be adjusted by decreasing her portion by an
amount equal to the value of the husband's imputed Social Security bene-
fits. 262 But the husband retired in 2000 and "designated his new wife as
252. Kelly, 9 P.3d at 1047.
253. Id. at 1048.
254. Id. at 1049.
255. Panetta v. Panetta, 851 A.2d 720, 728 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), certifica-
tion denied, 866 A.2d 984 (N.J. 2005).
256. Id. at 722.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 722 n.1, 727. Federal pensions are distributable upon divorce, Social Secu-
rity benefits are not. Id. at 727.
260. Id. at 722.
261. Id. at 722-23. The husband's pension order was subsequently identified as a court
order approved for processing (COAP), which is the order used for "distribution of the
marital share of a federal pension," rather than a QDRO, which is the order used for the
"distribution of the marital share of a private pension." Id. at 723 & nn.2-3, 725.
262. Id. at 723.
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the survivor beneficiary of his federal pension," which irrevocably pre-
cluded his former wife from the benefits under the agreed order.263 In
2002, the trial court issued an order denying the husband's motion to
have the wife's share of his federal pension "reduced by an imputed so-
cial security benefit. ', 264 On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey
held that the wife's Social Security benefit should be offset against her
share of the husband's federal pension.265 The court stated:
[A] federal employee may be entitled to an offset against a pri-
vate employee's share of the federal pension because only the
private employee would benefit from social security earned dur-
ing the marriage. Clearly, the purpose of the offset is to balance
the retirement benefits accrued by each of the parties during the
marriage. 266
Thus, similar to the distribution derived in Kelly, the Panetta court was
not offsetting by devaluing the wife's separate property Social Security
benefits, which Hisquierdo expressly prohibited.2 67 Her interest in those
benefits remained intact.26 Instead, the court offset the wife's Social Se-
curity benefits by devaluing the wife's interest in distributable marital
property in which both parties held an interest and over which the court
was not prohibited from exercising equitable authority.269 As stated in
Kelly, such a distribution posed no violation of Hisquierdo.27°
In Eickelberger v. Eickelberger, the husband was a public employee and
participated in a police and fireman's pension plan under the Public Em-
ployee Retirement System (PERS), which does not include a Social Secu-
rity component.27' The husband also participated in a deferred compen-
sation plan from the State of Ohio.2 2 The wife was a private employee
and was entitled to Social Security upon retirement.273 In dividing marital
property upon divorce, the trial court ordered the husband to transfer his
entire deferred compensation plan to the wife; this division awarded each
party approximately half of the entire available pension and retirement
benefits. 74 Pursuant to federal law, the wife's Social Security interest was
not distributable.275 The court noted that "a particular pension or retire-
263. Id. at 723-24.
264. Id. at 724.
265. Id. at 728.
266. Id.
267. See id. at 728-29; see also Kelly v. Kelly, 9 P.3d 1046, 1049 (Ariz. 2000).
268. Panetta, 851 A.2d at 728.
269. Id. at 729.
270. Kelly, 9 P.3d at 1049.







ment fund may not necessarily be subject to direct division but is subject
to evaluation and consideration in equitably distributing both parties'
marital assets. 2 76 The court recognized that in such cases, "public em-
ployees who do not participate in the Social Security system are penal-
ized because the value of their pensions are considered marital property
while a private employee's contributions to Social Security may not be
considered marital property under federal statute."277 The court pointed
out that, without such an offset, the husband was "being penalized for
working in the public sector."27 In the same respect, to deny an offset of
disability pay would penalize a nonmilitary spouse, who contributed to
and accrued a property interest in retired pay, for a military spouse's uni-
lateral decision to acquire disability pay for himself or herself. As in
Kelly and Panetta, the court in Eickelberger considered separate property
(the wife's potential future monthly Social Security benefits) by offsetting
with distributable marital property, over which the court had authority
(the husband's potential future PERS monthly benefits), when equitably
apportioning the balance of the parties' marital assets.279
Thus, within the context of Social Security benefits, state courts may
consider the inequity of disproportionate Social Security benefits when
considering whether to offset those benefits with other distributable
marital property. Hisquierdo is not violated by such a consideration be-
cause, by indirectly offsetting with other property, the property that the
federal payment scheme excludes from distribution remains intact and
reaches the beneficiary that Congress designates. Furthermore, the
Court in Hisquierdo viewed the federal benefit as a personal entitlement
solely of the participating spouse. In the Social Security and military re-
tirement pay contexts, however, the former spouse contributes to and
accrues an interest in the federal entitlement. The USFSPA was created
to protect this entitlement.
B. Railroad Retirement Benefits
The consideration of Railroad Retirement benefits in property distri-
bution, particularly in light of the Pension Protection Act of 2006,"° also
marks the trend toward expanding spousal rights in federal retirement
276. Id. (citing Hoyt v. Hoyt, 559 N.E.2d 1292, 1296 (Ohio 1990)); see also Smith v.
Smith, 632 N.E.2d 555, 558 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Stovall v. Stovall, No. 15335, 1992 WL
236770, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1992) (upholding order to deduct the present value
of one spouse's hypothetical Social Security account from the present value of the other
spouse's teacher's pension); Streeter v. Streeter, No. 91AP-14, 1991 WL 151215, at *2
(Ohio Ct. App. July 30, 1991).
277. Eickelberger, 638 N.E.2d at 135.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780.
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property. There are two components to the Railroad Retirement System.
Tier I of the system is financed by taxes imposed on employers and em-
ployees equal to the Social Security payroll tax and provides benefits akin
to Social Security benefits."1 Tier II of the system is akin to a private
pension plan system in which employers and employees contribute a cer-
tain percentage of pay toward the system to finance defined benefits, but
the federal government collects the Tier II payroll contributions and dis-
charges the benefits. 82 Until August 2006, the former spouse of a rail-
road employee could not receive benefits from either tier until the rail-
road employee actually retired and began receiving benefits. 83  Also,
upon the death of the railroad employee, a former spouse of a deceased
railroad employee was eligible for survivors' benefits under Tier I of the
system but was not eligible for any otherwise allowable benefits under
Tier 11.284 However, in August 2006, Congress passed the Pension Protec-
tion Act of 2006, which amended the Railroad Retirement Act to entitle
former spouses to Tier I or Tier II Railroad Retirement benefits notwith-
standing the actual entitlement of the employee spouse. It also pro-
vided that a surviving spouse receiving Tier II Railroad Retirement bene-
fits pursuant to a divorce decree may continue to receive his or her annu-
ity after the death of the participant spouse.2
Thus, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 expanded the marital prop-
erty entitlement of former spouses derived under the Act. An offset ap-
proach to military retirement benefits is consistent with this expansive
view of the marital interest of former spouses in pension and retirement
benefits, which Congress intended to be protected.
2. Considering Offsetting Military Disability Pay
State courts agree, and it is clear from the USFSPA, that disability pay
is the separate property of the disabled military retiree. M Most state
courts also agree that, prior to disability waiver, retired pay was marital
property to which the spouse contributed during the marriage and the
value of which the spouse maintains an interest in.m Even the McCarty
281. See 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 231a(a)(1), 231b(a)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).
282. See id. §§ 231f, 231n.
283. See id. § 231a(c).
284. See id.
285. Pension Protection Act § 1002.
286. Id. at § 1003.
287. See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c) (2000); e.g., West v. West, 475 N.Y.S.2d 493,494-95 (App.
Div. 1984).
288. See West, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 494-95 (holding that disability payments are separate
property as matter of law, but disability pension is marital property to the extent it reflects
deferred compensation). Pension plans are a form of deferred compensation to employees
for services rendered. See Van Loan v. Van Loan, 569 P.2d 214, 215 (Ariz. 1977). The
benefits are derived from contractual rights under the terms of the employment contract.
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Court held that if retired pay were community property, which it was not
then but is now considered, the retiree could not summarily deprive a
spouse of his or her interest in the property.2" The expanding concept of
community entitlement to federal benefits supports this premise. It is
clear from many other federal benefit contexts, particularly the Social
Security and Railroad Retirement contexts, that Congress intends for
spouses to accrue during the marriage a marital interest in the federal
retirement property to which they contribute during the marriage. Con-
gress may place limitations on the right of state courts to redistribute the
actual federal benefit property depending on the specific objectives of the
federal payment scheme, but Congress has not mandated that the value
of the property interest, once acquired, be taken away at the whim of the
retiree and inequitably redistributed as the separate property of only one
spouse. Quite to the contrary, Congress has authorized state divorce
courts to distribute that property according to the community property or
equitable distribution schemes of that jurisdiction.' As stated by the
court in In re Marriage of Fithian:
It is not incongruous for Congress to supply a program to aid
widows, who no longer have husbands to provide sustenance, and
omit to do so for ex-wives who can rely on state family law con-
cepts of support, alimony, and community property for a source
of income.
Under the equitable authority afforded to state courts in this context,
state courts are charged with distributing the value of property so as to
place the parties in equitable, if not equal, positions, without interfering
with the objectives of the federal payment scheme. It is not the obliga-
tion of state courts to distribute the actual property, per se, but to distrib-
ute the value of the property to which each party is entitled under the
respective distribution schemes. In the federal benefit contexts that have
been described herein, if state courts are authorized to distribute the ac-
Id. at 216. As such, any portion earned during the marriage is marital property, not merely
an expectancy of some future right or interest. Id. at 215; see also Walker v. Walker, 368
S.E.2d 89, 90 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (requiring that the spouse actually contribute to acquisi-
tion of property right).
289. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 226 (1981) (quoting Goldberg, supra note 121,
at 17).
Underlying the community treatment of retirement benefits is the concept that they
do not derive from the beneficence of the employer, but are properly part of the con-
sideration earned by the employee. Thus whether an employee is required to make
contributions to the retirement fund is irrelevant to the ultimate characterization of
the benefits as community property. Furthermore, the principle that retirement bene-
fits are community property has been held to apply whether the source of the retire-
ment fund lies in a state, federal, military, or private employment relationship.
In re Marriage of Fithian, 517 P.2d 449, 451 (Cal. 1974) (citations omitted).
290. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (2000).
291. Fithian, 517 P.2d at 454.
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tual federal benefit in question to a non-participating spouse, then Con-
gress will have authorized such a distribution in the respective statutes. If
state courts are preempted from distributing the actual property, then
Congress will have either preempted or placed limitations on the author-
ity of state courts to distribute the property. Outside of any such con-
gressional direction, however, the duty of state courts is to distribute
property according to the equitable principles prescribed through each
state's respective statutory distribution scheme.
In the context of military retired pay, under the USFSPA, Congress has
already directed state courts with respect to the authority to distribute
military retired pay. By enacting the USFSPA, Congress removed the
federal preemption instituted by McCarty and placed specific but limited
restrictions on state court authority to distribute retired pay. First, Con-
gress has directed that state courts are to categorize retired pay according
to the application of state law."' Within this scope, Congress has directed
that state courts may treat retired pay as marital property if that is what
state law prescribes, but that disability pay must remain the separate
property of the military retiree.293 Furthermore, the scope of state court
authority to distribute retired pay has one relevant limitation-the state,
through an appropriate divorce and property distribution order, may di-
rect the government to pay directly to a former spouse no more than 50%
of retired pay to satisfy a property distribution award.294 The primary
exception to this restriction is that a state court may award up to 65% of
retired pay to be paid directly to the former spouse to satisfy alimony or
child support awards.295 By default, any further authority over this prop-
292. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1).
293. Id. § 1408(e).
294. Id. § 1408(d)(5), (e)(1).
295. Id. § 1408(e)(4)(B). In 1975, Congress amended the Social Security Act to allow
for federal benefits to be used to satisfy child support and alimony obligations, thereby
creating an exception to all federal benefit provisions that prohibited the anticipation or
assignment of benefits. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 576 (1979) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 659 (1976)).
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, effective January 1, 1975, moneys (the
entitlement to which is based upon remuneration for employment) due from, or pay-
able by, the United States or the District of Columbia (including any agency, subdivi-
sion, or instrumentality thereof) to an individual, including members of the armed
services, shall be subject, in like manner and to the same extent as if the United States
or the District of Columbia were a private person, to legal process brought for the en-
forcement, against such individual of his legal obligations to provide child support or
make alimony payments.
42 U.S.C. § 659 (1976). Two years later, Congress defined the term "alimony" to exclude
any payment issuing from the equitable distribution of property. See Hisquierdo, 439 U.S.
at 577 (citing Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 501(d), 91
Stat. 126, 160).
The term "alimony", when used in reference to the legal obligations of an individual
to provide the same, means periodic payments of funds for the support and mainte-
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erty is derived under the authority of state courts to apply their own state
property distribution schemes. Many courts have held that the authority
of a state court to consider the portion of retired pay waived for disability
pay and to offset that value with other marital property falls within the
scope of this latter authority.
For example, in Hadrych v. Hadrych, the wife had been awarded 50%
of the husband's retired pay.2 6 The husband subsequently retired from
the military after being injured in a helicopter accident.297 The husband
waived 100% of his retired pay for disability pay, thereby reducing his
wife's payments 8 The court ordered the husband to pay directly to the
wife the amount that she was previously awarded under the original court
order.2" Recognizing the majority view, the court held that federal law
does not prohibit state courts from offsetting with other property retired
pay converted to disability pay, provided the relief does not directly di-
vide disability pay as marital property.3°° Expanding on its holding in
Scheidel v. Scheidel, in which the court held that a party may not unilat-
erally reduce another party's interest in military retired pay that was es-
301tablished in a marital settlement agreement, the court held that the
nance of the spouse (or former spouse) of the individual, and (subject to and in accor-
dance with State law) includes separate maintenance, alimony pendente lite, mainte-
nance, and spousal support, and includes attorney fees, interest, and court costs when
and to the extent that the same are expressly made recoverable as such pursuant to a
decree, order, or judgment issued in accordance with applicable State law by a court
of competent jurisdiction .... Such term does not include... any payment or transfer
of property or its value by an individual to the spouse or a former spouse of the indi-
vidual in compliance with any community property settlement, equitable distribution of
property, or other division of property between spouses or former spouses.
42 U.S.C. § 659(i)(3) (2000) (emphasis added).




299. Id. at *6.
300. Id. at *4; see also Danielson v. Evans, 36 P.3d 749, 755-56 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)
(finding that a court could enforce a divorce decree and order by instructing the husband
to "make up" payments that the wife lost after the husband converted retirement benefits
into disability benefits); In re Marriage of Lodeski, 107 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Colo. Ct. App.
2004) ("In light of the [Colorado Supreme Court's] reluctance to afford a party to a disso-
lution action the unilateral ability to defeat his or her spouse's interest in military retired
pay, we align ourselves with those states, representing the majority view, that enlist equita-
ble theories to prevent such a result."); Black v. Black, 842 A.2d 1280, 1285 (Me. 2004)
(finding that federal law "does not limit the authority of a state court to grant postjudg-
ment relief when military retirement pay previously divided by a divorce judgment is con-
verted to disability pay, so long as the relief awarded does not itself attempt to divide dis-
ability pay as marital property"); Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892, 895-97 (Tenn. 2001)
(ruling that the husband could not unilaterally reduce the wife's share of military retired
pay determined in the parties' final divorce decree).
301. Scheidel v. Scheidel, 4 P.3d 670, 673-75 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000).
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Scheidel rule applied even without such an agreement, stating: "[W]e
cannot accept the inequity and unfairness that results when one party is
allowed to unilaterally reduce the other's benefits established either un-
der an agreement or a final decree.' 2 The court held that this majority
rule was "not at odds with Mansell," which "only applies to the division
of payments at the time of divorce and does not preclude a court from
ordering the spouse who has adversely impacted the other spouse, by
converting retirement benefits to disability benefits, to pay the other
spouse directly."30 3 The court held that its order did not violate Mansell
because it "'does not specifically require that disability benefits provide
the source of the funds paid to the non-military spouse."' 4 Thus, al-
though the scope of its holding was limited to postjudgment orders, the
court held that federal law does not prohibit state courts from granting
relief by utilizing other marital property to offset the portion of retired
pay that is waived for disability pay in which the nonmilitary spouse has
an interest.305
Thus, there is a very significant distinction between direct and indirect
offsetting that courts refusing to allow offsetting overlook. The distinc-
tion is found in whether the offsetting interferes with the federal payment
scheme set out in the USFSPA. (See Table 5).
302. Hadrych, 2006 WL 3913768, at *3; see also Resare v. Resare, 908 A.2d 1006, 1007-
08, 1010 (R.I. 2006) (holding the husband to the terms of the property settlement agree-
ment, which gave the wife a 35% interest in gross military pension, after husband unilater-
ally converted retired pay to disability pay).
303. Hadrych, 2006 WL 3913768, at *4.
304. Id. (citing Scheidel, 4 P.3d at 674); see also Resare, 908 A.2d at 1010 (citing Dexter
v. Dexter, 661 A.2d 171 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995); Krapf v. Krapf, 786 N.E.2d 318 (Mass.
2003); Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892 (Tenn. 2001)).





Table 5 represents the distribution of military retired pay, which includes
disposable or retired pay of $1,000, a portion of which is waived for dis-
ability pay (Box A), with the remainder being distributed according to
the limitations set out in the federal payment scheme under the USFSPA
(Boxes B1 and B2). Assuming $10,000 of other marital property, an off-
set of the disability award (Box D) is derived from other disposable mari-
tal property (Box C), the remainder of which is distributed according to
the appropriate state property distribution scheme, assuming a 50/50 split
(Boxes C1 and C2).
The distinction between a direct and indirect offset is created by identi-
fying which payment scheme the offset is derived from. A direct offset
would necessarily utilize retired pay (funds from Box B2) to compensate
for a specific amount of disability pay transformed from Box B to Box A.
Such utilization of retired funds may be (but is not necessarily) contrary
to the limitations on the payment scheme set out in the USFSPA. The
USFSPA allows a state court to distribute to the former spouse only the
marital property from Box Bi and Box C. As demonstrated here and as
recognized by many courts, although these limitations may be inequitable
for the former spouse, it may be contrary to the federal payment scheme
for a state court to offset by utilizing funds from unauthorized boxes.
This is quite poignantly expressed by the court in In re Marriage of
Crook, when it recognized, correctly, that "it is not the province of this
court-or of any state court-to interfere with the federal scheme, no
matter how unfair it may appear to be.... Accordingly, it is up to Con-
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gress, and not the state courts, to correct any inequity in the federal sys-
tem."3' 6 The federal payment scheme relevant to military retired pay is
designed simply to assure that the military spouse acquires the maximum
property interest from Box A and Box B2; Box A is the separate prop-
erty of the military spouse, and Box B2 is reserved as marital property
not subject to direct distribution. If Congress had provided only that
state courts are restricted to these limitations in the distribution of retired
pay, then state courts could consider military retired pay no further. In
part, such was the effect of McCarty. But the federal scheme is not de-
signed to deprive a former spouse of property interests that have already
accrued to his or her benefit or to assure the inequitable distribution of
marital property. Instead, Congress specifically provided in the USFSPA
that, subject to these limitations, states are free to distribute military re-
tired pay according to their own state property distribution schemes.
Thus, indirect offsetting utilizes other marital property (Box C) to
compensate for property transformed from marital property (Box B) to
separate property (Box A) for the sole benefit of one spouse. The
USFSPA, 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1), specifically authorizes state courts to
make such compensatory distributions if their respective property distri-
bution schemes provide for them to do so.07 Thus, utilizing funds from
Box C to implement equitable considerations does no harm to the federal
scheme. Property that Congress intends to be acquired by the military
spouse is left intact. Within the authorized distribution scheme of state
courts, state courts are not manipulating property in any way that is dif-
ferent from what Congress authorized through the federal payment
scheme or what is authorized through the application of state court provi-
sions, even when federal benefits are not being considered. With respect
to the authority of state courts to implement equity in this way, the court
in Crook further recognized that the issue of whether persons receiving
benefits in lieu of Social Security must be placed in a position similar to
that of the other spouse whose Social Security will be exempt from equi-
table distribution is left "for another day."3°8 But this "other day" has
already arrived. Congress has already provided for this authority in §
1408(c)(1) by providing that, with respect to the distribution of military
retired pay, state courts are free to consider military retired pay when
equitably distributing other marital property, provided that state courts
respect the scope of the limitations of the federal payment scheme under
the USFSPA.
Thus, disability pay, although characterized as separate property of the
participating spouse, is not immune from the consideration of state courts
306. In re Marriage of Crook, 813 N.E.2d 198, 205-06 (Ill. 2004).
307. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (2000).
308. Crook, 813 N.E.2d at 206.
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when applying the community or equitable property distribution schemes
relevant to that court or jurisdiction, any more than any other separate
property may be considered under such schemes. Generally, state courts
may consider a party's future separate property earnings in equitably
distributing marital property.3°9 More specifically, many courts have held
that separate property disability pay may be considered in effectuating
equitable awards of alimony and child support, even when disability pay
is the only source of available income.310 Some courts have held that, in
applying relevant equitable distribution provisions, disability pay may be
309. See Krize v. Krize, Nos. S-11842, S-11862, 2006 WL 2458571, at *6-8 (Alaska Aug.
25, 2006) (determining that prospective inheritance may be considered in ascertaining
financial condition for property division purposes); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 32 S.W.2d 41,
45-46 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000) (using discretionary power under property division statute to
fashion unequal division of marital property in favor of wife based in part on consideration
of husband's separate property future inheritance); In re Marriage of Smith, 427 N.E.2d
1262, 1266 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (considering, under property division statute, the wife's
separate property vested interest in future inheritance in order to fashion equitable distri-
bution of marital property and support payments); In re Marriage of Rhinehart, 704
N.W.2d 677, 683 (Iowa 2005) (considering the wife's separate property future interest in
multi-million dollar trust in awarding the husband full value of marital property in the
form of money in a bank account); In re Marriage of Harris, 132 P.3d 502, 508 (Mont.
2006) (remanding for consideration of future inheritance to determine equitable distribu-
tion of marital assets, although the husband's interest in trust fund was separate property
not subject to division); Dorton v. Dorton, 336 S.E.2d 415, 421-22 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)
(considering, in a divorce action, the husband's separate property in the form of a dental
license when determining equitable distribution of marital property under state's property
division statute); Hussey v. Hussey, 312 S.E.2d 267, 271 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
even though the husband's inherited property is separate property not subject to division,
the court may consider it as a factor in determining equitable division of marital property);
Hailey v. Hailey, 176 S.W.3d 374, 379-82 (Tex. App. 2004) (determining equitable division
of community property in part by considering each party's separate estates in the form of
the wife's stocks and employee profit-sharing plan weighed against the husband's equity in
his separate home and earning capacity based on his formal education); Grumbeck v.
Grumbeck, No. 2005AP2512, 2006 WL 2612857, at *2-3 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2006)
(holding that gifted assets cannot be split in half to make even unless "financial privation"
results); see also Searcy v. Searcy, 627 S.E.2d 572, 574 (Ga. 2006) (awarding wife, as ali-
mony, a portion of the husband's separate interest in estates of deceased parents); Dem-
man v. Demman, 489 N.W.2d 161, 163-64 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (awarding the wife a por-
tion of the husband's separate inheritance where equitable division of marital assets was
insufficient to maintain wife).
310. See Allen v. Allen, 650 So. 2d 1019, 1020 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (considering
disability pay for alimony, even if "most of the paying spouse's income consists of military
retirement designated as disability"); In re Marriage of Anderson, 522 N.W.2d 99, 102
(Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the court can force veteran to pay child support, "even
if the veteran's only means of satisfying his obligation is to use veteran's benefits received
as compensation for a service connected disability"); In re Marriage of Strong, 8 P.3d 763,
769-70 (Mont. 2000) (finding that a court could consider disability pay in the case of
spousal or child support, or unequal property distribution); Kramer v. Kramer, 567 N.W.2d
100, 113 (Neb. 1997) (considering disability pay as income for purposes of changed circum-
stances to modify fixed alimony, not as part of the estate); Wingard v. Wingard, 11 Pa. D.
& C.4th 343, 345 (1991) (ruling that disability pay is income for spousal and child support).
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considered as income for purposes of determining the future economic
circumstances of the parties."' Courts have even considered disability
waivers when the waiver occurred after the dissolution of the marriage,
insofar as it affected the equitable distribution of property to which the
other spouse had acquired an interest.312 There are many courts that have
enforced agreements between parties in which the military spouse agreed
to distribute separate property disability pay to the non-participating313
spouse. Such enforcement has been held not to violate the scope of the
restrictions set out in Mansell.
314
311. See Kabaci v. Kabaci, 373 So. 2d 1144, 1146-47 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979) (allowing
retirement benefits to be used as a source of income from which to pay periodic alimony,
but prohibiting the use of retirement benefits for alimony in gross or property settlement),
overruled by Ex parte Vaughn, 634 So. 2d 533 (Ala. 1993) (holding that disposable military
retirement benefits accumulated during marriage are divisible as marital property); State
ex rel. D.F. v. L.T., 934 So. 2d 687, 691, 694 (La. 2006) (including military housing and
subsistence allowance in gross income for purposes of calculating child support); Sward v.
Sward, 410 N.W.2d 442, 444 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); In re Marriage of Kraft, 832 P.2d 871,
877 (Wash. 1992) (regarding disability pay as future income for economic circumstances of
parties and basis for equity).
312. In re Krempin, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 134, 143 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (determining that
post-dissolution waivers can be considered); Black v. Black, 842 A.2d 1280, 1286 (Me.
2004) (holding that the wife could get what she would have gotten absent waiver); Troxell
v. Troxell, 28 P.3d 1169, 1171 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001) (finding that a court can enforce
property division award where retirement was divided but then subsequently waived to
avoid award); see also Harris v. Harris, 991 P.2d 262, 265 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (proscribing
transformation to disability once decree is final); Gatfield v. Gatfield, 682 N.W.2d 632, 637-
38 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that the USFSPA does not preclude veteran from con-
tracting not to waive and to indemnify if he does); Radigan v. Radigan, 465 N.W.2d 483,
486-87 (S.D. 1991) (ruling that the husband must share with ex-wife the increase in retired
benefits that results from post-divorce efforts); Neese v. Neese, 669 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Tex.
App. 1984) (considering post-divorce increases in the future payments of a husband's non-
disability military retirement benefits).
313. See Gatfield, 682 N.W.2d at 637; Hoskins v. Skojec, 696 N.Y.S.2d 303, 305 (App.
Div. 1999) (determining that a court cannot divide disability pay but can enforce parties'
agreement to divide); Ingalls v. Ingalls, 624 N.E.2d 368, 375 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (affirm-
ing division of nonvested military retirement benefits consistent with agreement of the
parties expressed at trial); Cherry v. Figart, 620 N.E.2d 174, 176-77 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)
(dividing nonvested pension when parties agreed to divide retirement benefits and suit was
brought for enforcement); see also Towner v. Towner, 858 S.W.2d 888, 891-92 (Tenn. 1993)
(affirming approval of separation agreement of nonvested retirement payments). But see
Abernethy v. Fishkin, 699 So. 2d 235, 240 (Fla. 1997) (finding that a court cannot enforce
agreements but may enforce judgments with indemnification clauses, as long as disability
portion is not used); Goodson v. Goodson, 744 A.2d 828, 831 (R.I. 2000) (determining that
as a component of property settlement agreement, family court may divide only a spouse's
disposable retired pay under USFSPA in effect at time of divorce decree).
314. See Owen v. Owen, 419 S.E.2d 267,270 (Va. Ct. App. 1992) (holding a settlement
agreement's guarantee or indemnification clause requiring the retiree to pay the same
amount of support, despite beginning to collect VA disability pay, does not violate
Mansell); see also Abernethy, 699 So. 2d at 239-40.
[Vol. 56:297
Military Disability Election
A. The Authority to Offset
In 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1), Congress specifically authorized state courts
to categorize and distribute military retired pay according to the applica-
tion of state law. 5 Many states statutorily provide within their own state
distribution scheme for the limits of such distribution.316 Even if not spe-
cifically expressed, however, in making such distributions, every state
employs property distribution provisions upon the dissolution of mar-
riage that are applicable to a state court's authority to consider military
disability pay.31 When equitably distributing marital property within
315. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (2000).
316. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-203(b) (LexisNexis 2006) (defining
military retired pay as marital property); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West
1998) (defining vested and nonvested pensions as marital property subject to division);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.18(1) (West 2005) (providing that vested or nonvested
retirement benefits may be divided); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.54(5) (West 2006) (defining
vested or nonvested pensions as marital property); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-366(8) (2004)
(stating that military pensions-vested or not-are part of marital estate and may be di-
vided as property or alimony); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:16-a (LexisNexis Supp. 2005)
(including vested and nonvested pensions as marital property); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23
(West Supp. 2006) (including pensions in equitable distribution of marital property); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(1) (2005) (providing that marital property includes all vested and
nonvested pension, retirement, and other types of deferred compensation rights; vested
and nonvested military pensions eligible under USFSPA); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-
121(b)(1)(B) (2005) (defining vested and nonvested pensions as marital property).
317. ALA. CODE § 30-2-51 (LexisNexis 1998) (stating that a court may consider the
separate estates of each spouse in determining distribution of property upon divorce);
ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(a)(4) (2004) (giving courts the discretion to consider joint or
separate property acquired during marriage as well as discretion to invade non-marital
property if equity so requires); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318(C) (2000) (providing
courts with the discretion to impress a lien upon separate property for equitable purposes
such as alimony or child support); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-315 (2002) (stating that a court
shall distribute marital property equally-unless the division would be. inequitable-based
on consideration of several factors including other sources of income); CAL. FAM. CODE §
2550 (West 2004) (requiring courts to divide community property equally); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 14-10-113(1) (2005) (stating that a court has discretion to divide marital property
in such proportions as it deems just after considering several factors including the eco-
nomic circumstances of each party and value of their separate property); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-81 (West 2004) (granting courts the discretion to assign all or any part of
one spouse's estate to other spouse after considering several factors including amount and
sources of income and each party's prospects for future acquisition of assets or income);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (1999) (stating that a court shall equitably divide marital
property into just proportions upon considering several factors including amount and
sources of income and opportunity for future acquisition of assets or income); D.C. CODE
§ 16-910 (Supp. 2006) (requiring courts to distribute marital property in just and equitable
manner upon consideration of several factors including sources of income and opportunity
for future acquisition of assets and income); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075 (West 2006) (pro-
viding that a court must begin with premise for equal distribution unless unequal distribu-
tion is justified based upon several factors including discretion to consider any other factor
necessary for equity); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-5 (2004) (stating that a court may grant per-
manent alimony to either party upon consideration of several factors including separate
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estates of each party and any other factors court deems equitable and proper); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 580-47 (LexisNexis 2005) (providing that a court may divide estate of parties
whether mixed, joint, or separate, in just and equitable manner); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-
906 (2006) (stating that all property acquired after marriage by either party is community
property); 750 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/503(d) (West Supp. 2006) (requiring a court to
divide marital property in just proportions considering several factors including each par-
ty's amount and sources of income and opportunity for future acquisition of assets and
income); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-15-7-5 (LexisNexis 2003) (stating that a court presumes
equal division of marital property unless equal division would not be just and reasonable
after consideration of each spouse's separate property and each party's future earning
capacity); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West Supp. 2006) (mandating that the courts divide
all marital property equitably upon consideration of several factors including separate
property of each party, earning capacity of each party, and any other factor the court de-
termines to be relevant); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(b)(1) (Supp. 2003) (stating that a
court shall divide all property upon consideration of several factors including earning ca-
pacity of each party and any other factors the court considers necessary for just and rea-
sonable division of property); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.190(1) (LexisNexis 1999) (re-
quiring a court to divide marital property in just proportions upon consideration of several
factors including value of property set aside to each spouse); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2336 (1985) (stating that each party owns an undivided one-half interest in community
property); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 953(1) (1998) (providing that a court shall
divide marital property in just proportions upon consideration of several factors including
value of property set apart to each spouse); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-205 (Lex-
isNexis 2006) (authorizing courts to divide marital property in accordance with equities
and rights of parties upon consideration of several factors including value of each party's
property interests and any other factor necessary for fair and equitable distribution);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West 1998) (allowing a court to assign to spouse all
or any part of estate of other spouse upon consideration of several factors including
amount and sources of income and capacity for future acquisition of assets and income);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.19 (West 2005) (stating that a court may divide marital
property in such parts as it deems just and reasonable); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 (West
2006) (providing that a court shall make just and equitable division of marital property
upon consideration of several factors and may apportion up to half of a party's non-marital
property if marital property division is inadequate); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-23 (West
2005) (giving courts the discretion to make just and equitable allowance); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 452.330 (West 2003) (stating that a court shall divide marital property in just proportions
upon consideration of several factors including value of each spouse's non-marital prop-
erty); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202 (2005) (requiring a court to equitably apportion
property and assets, whether joint or separate, upon consideration of several factors in-
cluding each party's amount and sources of income and opportunity of each for future
acquisition of assets and income); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (2004) (permitting court to
order reasonable division of property to make equitable distribution); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 125.150 (LexisNexis 2004) (mandating that courts make equal disposition of com-
munity property upon consideration of several factors, and allowing discretion to appor-
tion a part of one spouse's separate property as the court deems just and equitable); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:16-a (LexisNexis Supp. 2005) (allowing a court to order equitable
division of property upon consideration of several factors including separate property of
each party, sources of income, opportunity for future acquisition of assets and income, and
any other factor a court deems relevant); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 2006)
(stating that a court shall make equitable distribution of property upon consideration of
several factors including income and earning capacity of each party and any other factors
court deems relevant); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (LexisNexis 2006) (providing that a court
shall apportion property in just and proper manner upon consideration of several factors
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these provisions, state courts may be expressly authorized to consider the
separate property of parties, which would include disability pay, or may
including value of amount of property awarded to each spouse and type and nature of
respective spouse's assets); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5) (McKinney Supp. 2006)
(requiring a court to distribute marital property equitably upon consideration of several
factors including future financial circumstances of each party and any other factor court
finds to be just and proper); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (2005) (stating that a court shall
make equitable division of property upon consideration of several factors including income
of each party, expectation of various types of deferred compensation, and any other factor
court finds just and proper); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (2004) (ordering a court to make
equitable distribution of property); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(B)-(C) (LexisNexis
2000) (providing that a court shall make equitable division of marital property upon con-
sideration of several factors including assets of each spouse and any other factor court
finds relevant and equitable); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 121 (West 2001) (requiring a
court to make just and reasonable division of property); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(f)
(2005) (stating that a court shall divide marital property as may be just and proper upon
consideration of all circumstances); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502(a) (West Supp. 2006)
(ordering courts to equitably divide marital property in just manner upon consideration of
several factors including amount and sources of income, future acquisition of assets and
income, and value of property set apart to each party); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1 (Supp.
2005) (authorizing court to assign to either party portion of estate of other spouse upon
consideration of several factors including amount and sources of income, future acquisition
of assets and income, and any factor court finds just and proper); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-
472 (Supp. 2005) (mandating a court to make equitable apportionment of parties' marital
property giving weight to several factors including non-marital property of each spouse
and any other factor court deems relevant); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-44 (1999) (allow-
ing court to make equitable division of marital property considering equity and circum-
stances of parties); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121 (2005) (requiring court to equitably
distribute marital property upon consideration of several factors including value of each
party's separate property and any other factor necessary to consider equities between the
parties); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.001 (Vernon 2006) (stating that the court shall order
division of estate of parties in manner that the court deems just and right); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 2006) (permitting court to make equitable orders pertaining to
property of parties); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (1998) (requiring court to equitably
divide and assign property upon consideration of several factors including source and
amount of income and future acquisition of assets and income); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3
(Supp. 2006) (stating that a court shall determine division of marital property upon consid-
eration of several factors including any other factors necessary to arrive at a fair and equi-
table monetary award); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080 (West 2005) (providing that a
court shall divide property in just and equitable manner upon consideration of several
factors including nature and extent of separate property); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-5-610
(LexisNexis 2004) (requiring a court to order just and equitable distribution of property
and that it may consider separate estates of each party); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West
2001) (granting court the discretion to divide community property in equitable manner
upon consideration of several factors including whether one party has substantial assets
not subject to division and any other factors court deems relevant); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-
2-114 (2005) (requiring a court to make a just and equitable disposition of property); see
also P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §§ 381, 385 (1993 & Supp. 2003) (stating that a divorce re-
quires division of all property, and court may grant alimony upon consideration of several
factors including financial wealth of each party and any other factor deemed appropriate);
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 109 (Supp. 2006) (allowing a court to order monetary award to
party upon consideration of needs).
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be authorized more generally to consider separate property through a
catch-all provision that enables a court to use its discretion to distribute
property equitably. Notwithstanding the language of individual provi-
sions, every state has authority to distribute marital property, and within
that authority, courts must include some distribution of military retired
pay.
Within this context (see Table 6), a significant distinction must be rec.-
ognized.
Table 6
Many courts hold that what Congress authorized in § 1408(c)(1) was
that state cour ts may distribute, within the 50% limitation prescribed in §
1.408(d)(5) and § 1408(e)(1) (Boxes H I and 1B2), only disposable retired
pay (Box B)"' This view excludes disability pay as a consideration unlder
31 8. See x ate Rilleck, 711 So. 2d 105, 109 (Ala. 2000) (finding that an award of a
portion of disability pay violates I 1SSPA); I lapaey v. Itiapney, 824 S.W.2d 40(8,409 (Ark.
Ct. App, 199)) (piohihitig dist ibution of disability pay); hi We Marriage of Costo, 203 (al.
Rptr85, 5, 88.89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (excluding disability pay by definition); li re Marriage
of Riley Cunmingham, 7 P.3d 992,994 95 (Colo, C, App. 1999) (determining that a distri-
bution of disability pay was not allowed); McMahan v. MeMahan, 567 So. 2d 976, 978 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that no portion of disability may be subject to distribution);
In re Marriage of Strn ck, 570 N.F,2d 1,2 (I1. App. ('t. 1991) (finding that disability pay is
separate property, and the excess is marital propelty); it re Marriage of tPieice, 982 P.2d
995, 998 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting direct or indirect offsetting); Rc mdcn v. Rearden,
568 So. 2d 111t, 1115 (La. Ct App. 199(1) (holding that a court may not conlsidcr total
retired pay); Tarver v. 'arver, 557 So, Id 1056, 1061 ( a. Ct. App. 191)) (1inding that dis-
ability benefits are excluded); King v, King, 386 N.W.2d 562, 561 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)
(ruling that disability pay is not included in definition); Bishop v. Bishol), 440 S.L.2d 591,
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the authority of a state court to apply its state property distribution
scheme to other marital property. If the scope of state authority to dis-
tribute marital property were restricted to the limitations of the USFSPA
and the distribution of military retired pay (Box B), this view would be
accurate. But state courts also have authority to distribute other marital
property within the scope of state statutory limitations (Box C). Even if
disability pay is expressly excluded from the scope of state court author-
ity to distribute disposable retired pay, Congress did not preempt the
authority of state courts to apply state law with respect to the distribution
of other marital property.19 Thus, within the USFSPA, § 1408(c)(1) must
not be read to preempt the application of state law respecting other
property. Instead, it must be read to be inclusive in that it authorizes
state courts to include disposable retired pay as part of their normal ap-
plication of state property distribution law, albeit with specific limitations
prescribed by § 1408(d)(5) and § 1408(e)(1), in conjunction with the dis-
tribution of other marital property. For state courts to interpret the au-
thority afforded under § 1408 to exclude other equitable considerations,
including the separate property of the parties, when state law otherwise
authorizes state courts to make such considerations, is to interpret the
USFSPA as preempting state law and the authority of state courts to dis-
tribute any other marital property within Box C. Such an application of
federal law is not just a return to McCarty, in which states were pre-
empted from distributing non-disability military retired pay (Box B), but
it surpasses McCarty in scope in that it necessarily restricts the authority
of state courts to apply state law to other marital property (Box C) in a
way that Congress neither provided for nor intended.
In her dissent in Mansell, Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Black-
mun joined, asserted that McCarty did not preclude states from charac-
terizing as marital property the portion of retired pay waived for disabil-
320ity pay. Instead, she asserted that, by enacting the USFSPA, Congressintended to give the states the authority "'to treat military pensions in the
597 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that disability pay is separate and must be treated as
distributional factor); Hisgen v. Hisgen, 554 N.W.2d 494, 498 (S.D. 1996) (ruling that dis-
ability is specifically excluded from definition); Lambert v. Lambert, 395 S.E.2d 207, 209
(Va. Ct. App. 1990) (excluding disability); In re Marriage of Jennings, 980 P.2d 1248, 1256
(Wash. 1999) (prohibiting distribution of disability).
319. See Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 597 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (de-
claring that the Act does not "'positively require"' preemption). Rather, the whole pur-
pose of the Act was to restore the states to their traditional authority and to assist former
spouses, not hinder them. The USFSPA is "primarily a remedial statute creating a mecha-
nism whereby former spouses armed with State court orders may enlist the Federal Gov-
ernment to assist them in obtaining some of their property entitlements upon divorce." Id.
320. Id. at 596-97.
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same manner as they treat other retirement benefits.' 3 21  Justice
O'Connor claimed that the majority in Mansell was wrong to conclude
that states "can apply their community property laws to military retire-
ment pay only to the extent that the [USFSPA] affirmatively grants them
authority to do so. 322 Even the majority in Mansell recognized that the
savings clause under § 1408(e)(6)' 23 "serves the limited purpose of defeat-
ing any inference that the federal direct payments mechanism [(under
Boxes B1 and B2)] displaced the authority of state courts to divide and
garnish property not covered by the mechanism [(under Box C)].,
324
What Justice O'Connor asserted was that § 1408(a)(4) -which defines
disposable retired pay as excluding disability pay-and its incorporation
into the marital property provision of § 1408(c)(1) only limits the gar-
nishment remedy created by the Act; it does not limit the states' author-
ity to characterize the waived portion as marital property.3z  Justice
O'Connor reasoned that Congress included the waiver provision under
the garnishment provision because if Congress did not include it, then the
government could garnish disability pay, thereby eviscerating the anti-
assignment clause of 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a).326 Thus, she argued, it should
not be read to preclude state authority to characterize the pay as marital,
but only to preclude the use of the federal direct payment or garnishment
327mechanism. Many state courts have applied this reasoning to the ten-year marriage requirement of § 1408(d)(2),328 by holding that if the ten-
321. Id. at 596 (quoting S. REP. No. 97-502, at 10 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1596,1604-05).
322. Id.
323. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(6) (2000) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to re-
lieve a member of liability for the payment of alimony, child support, or other payments
required by a court order on the grounds that payments made out of disposable retired pay
... have been made in the maximum amount permitted under [§ 1408(e)(1)] .... Any such
unsatisfied obligation of a member may be enforced by any means available under law
other than the means provided under this section...
324. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 590.
325. Id. at 597-98 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 598.
327. Id. at 599; see also Ex parte Smallwood, 811 So. 2d 537, 541 (Ala. 2001); Deliduka
v. Deliduka, 347 N.W.2d 52,55-56 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); In re Marriage of Bocanegra, 792
P.2d 1263, 1268 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990); Forney v. Minard, 849 P.2d 724, 730 (Wyo. 1993).
But see Chisnell v. Chisnell, 385 N.W.2d 758, 761-62 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Coon v. Coon,
614 S.E.2d 616, 617-18 (S.C. 2005) (finding that state court has jurisdiction but is pre-
empted from granting more than 50% combined), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1025 (2006); In re
Marriage of Smith, 669 P.2d 448, 450-51 (Wash. 1983); Kelly v. Kelly, 78 P.3d 220, 223-24
(Wyo. 2003).
328. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(2) ("If the spouse or former spouse to whom payments are to
be made under this section was not married to the member for a period of 10 years or
more during which the member performed at least 10 years of service creditable in deter-
mining the member's eligibility for retired pay, payments may not be made under this
section to the extent that they include an amount resulting from the treatment by the court
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year requirement is not met, it does not limit a state court's authority to
distribute disposable retired pay; it merely limits the state court's author-
ity to garnish it directly from the government.29 Thus, with regard to the
garnishment provision:
[W]hile a former spouse may not receive community property
payments that exceed 50 percent of a retiree's disposable retire-
ment pay through the direct federal garnishment mechanism, §
1408(e)(1), a state court is free to characterize gross retirement
pay as community property depending on the law of its jurisdic-
tion, and former spouses may pursue any other remedy "available
under law" to satisfy that interest. "Nothing" in the Former
Spouses' Protection Act relieves military retirees of liability un-
der such law if they possess other assets equal to the value of the
330former spouse's share of the gross retirement pay.
However, the majority in Mansell determined that it was more plausible
that Congress would not authorize state courts to remedy the inequity
resulting from this application of the USFSPA, reasoning that if Congress
intended this inequity to be remedied, it would have affirmatively author-
ized it. Even Justice O'Connor agreed that, as a result of the majority
holding in Mansell, "[ilt is now once again up to Congress to address the
inequity created by the Court in situations such as this one., 33' The prob-
lem in this is that, even after Mansell, state courts are no closer to uni-
formity in applying this interpretation of the USFSPA than they were
between 1981 and 1989, before Mansell. In fact, state courts are less uni-
form on this issue than they were prior to 1981, when the Court decided
McCarty. The reason for this continuing lack of uniformity is that some
state courts are awaiting explicit authorization from Congress, but Con-
gress has already authorized state courts to remedy the inherent inequity
of the USFSPA through their own discretion to offset with other marital
under subsection (c) of disposable retired pay of the member as property of the member or
property of the member and his spouse.").
329. See id.; see also In re Marriage of Beltran, 227 Cal. Rptr. 924, 927 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986) (holding that the requirement of a ten-year marriage in § 1408(d)(2) only regards
direct payment from the government, not offsetting payments under state court property
settlement); Warren v. Warren, 563 N.E.2d 633, 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that even
if the parties are not married ten years, the court can still make an award, but not directly
from the Department of Defense-the remainder can come from spouse); Carranza v.
Carranza, 765 S.W.2d 32, 33-34 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989); Warner v. Warner, 651 So. 2d 1339,
1340 (La. 1995); Deason v. Deason, 611 N.W.2d 369, 371-72 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000);
Pacheco v. Quintana, 730 P.2d 1, 5 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985); Canales v. Canales, No. 88-CA-
52, 1989 WL 24187, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 17, 1989); In re Marriage of Wood, 676 P.2d
338, 340 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); Chandler v. Chandler, 991 S.W.2d 367, 401-02 (Tex. App.
1999); Konzen v. Konzen, 693 P.2d 97, 99 (Wash. 1985); Parker v. Parker, 750 P.2d 1313,
1314-15 (Wyo. 1988).
330. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 601 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
331. Id. at 604.
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property that portion of retired pay that is waived for disability pay. It is
state courts, not Congress, that are responsible for this lack of uniformity
"because . . . Congress has already expressed its intention that the States
have the authority to characterize waived retirement pay as property di-
visible upon divorce.
332
B. The Effect of Offsetting on the Objectives of the Federal Payment
Scheme
Many courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have recog-
nized the inequity that the USFSPA creates for former spouses when
military spouses waive retired pay for disability pay. The issue that re-
mains unresolved among state courts with respect to the distribution of
military retired pay is whether Congress has already afforded state courts
the authority to remedy any inequity resulting from the federal payment
scheme, or whether Congress must amend the USFSPA to authorize such
a remedy.
Congress created the USFSPA to accomplish specific objectives, which
courts also recognize: (1) to provide for the security of military personnel;
(2) to accommodate the personnel management needs of the military
with respect to recruitment and retirement; and (3) to protect former
spouses.33 Congress was aware that achieving these objectives through
the USFSPA, on its face, would result in inequity for former spouses.
This Article proposes that Congress did not conclude that such an inher-
ently inequitable result could not be remedied without interfering with
the objectives of the federal payment scheme.'3 If it had, it would not
have provided for state law to apply pursuant to § 1408(c)(1). The
McCarty Court did come to this conclusion when it held that federal law
preempted state law because it interfered with the federal payment
scheme and objectives at that time. But by creating the USFSPA, specifi-
cally § 1408(c)(1), Congress created a federal payment scheme for mili-
332. Id. This point is supported by other case law described in this article. See, e.g.,
Stroshine v. Stroshine, 652 P.2d 1193, 1195 (N.M. 1982); White v. White, 734 P.2d 1283,
1286-87 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987); Deliduka, 347 N.W.2d at 55-56. However, this does not
necessarily mean that a state court should order actual disability pay (from Box A) to be
awarded to a nonmilitary spouse to satisfy a property distribution award. Justice
O'Connor recognized that garnishing actual disability benefits would eviscerate the anti-
assignment clause of § 3101(a). Mansell, 490 U.S. at 598 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Rather, Justice O'Connor refers to the use of "state-law garnishment remedies to attach
the value of [that] portion of [the] community property." Id. at 601. What Justice
O'Connor discusses in this respect throughout her dissent, without actually using the term,
is "offsetting."
333. See McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210,232-33 (1981).
334. See Mansell, 490 U.S. at 603 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("It is inconceivable that




tary retired pay that allowed for state courts to apply state property dis-
tribution laws in a way that did not interfere with federal objectives un-
derlying the scheme. Congress thereby determined that federal law need
not preempt state law on this issue, and the effect of the USFSPA was to
supersede McCarty. The question for state courts considering the scope
of their authority under the USFSPA, then, is whether the application of
state law, which treats the portion of military retired pay waived for dis-
ability pay as marital property subject to equitable considerations, does
damage to relevant federal objectives. It does not; because, by offsetting
the waived portion of retired pay with other marital property, state courts
can provide for the security of military personnel while protecting the
interests of former spouses, without jeopardizing military personnel ob-
jectives. A permissible offset of disability benefits could be achieved by
awarding the nonmilitary spouse, as separate property, a portion of mari-
tal property other than disability payments, in lieu of the marital portion
he or she would have received if marital retired pay had not been unilat-
erally waived for disability pay. (See Table 6).
First, such a distribution does not interfere with the security that Con-
gress intended to provide to the military retiree. What Congress in-
tended by allowing military retirees to waive a portion of retired pay for
disability pay was to provide disabled military retirees with tax relief and
to assure that disabled retirees actually acquire their disability pay and
their marital interest in disposable retired pay. Congress did not intend
to benefit military retirees at the expense of former spouses by allowing
military retirees to unilaterally transform a former spouse's marital inter-
est into his or her own separate property interest without equitable com-
pensation if it were warranted. By authorizing state courts to treat
waived retired pay as they would any other marital property, Congress
afforded state courts the opportunity to employ their own discretion to
determine whether such a waiver was inequitable to a former spouse. If
the state court determined that such a waiver was inequitable, then off-
setting the value of that property with other marital property would ef-
fectuate the following: (1) The military retiree would still acquire the
maximum disability benefit that Congress intended him or her to have;
since offsetting would be accomplished with other marital property, the
actual disability pay that Congress calculated as necessary for the security
of the retiree would remain intact and would go to the retiree as separate
property; (2) Because such an offset assures that the military retiree may
still acquire the maximum disability benefit provided under the USFSPA,
the military retiree will still enjoy the tax benefit that Congress intended
by allowing such a waiver; (3) Offsetting does not deprive the military
spouse of any entitlement or interest that he or she would not have been
deprived of had he or she not opted for a disability waiver; the portion of
retired pay that was waived for disability would remain marital property
as disposable retired pay, subject to distribution upon divorce; (4) Offset-
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ting does not cause the military retiree to be deprived of any interest that
Congress intended him or her to have under the federal payment scheme;
any interest in other marital property that a military retiree must waive
through an offset is gained in disability pay and the resulting tax benefit.
Furthermore, an offset would only be warranted if the state court deter-
mined that equity required it; thus, with respect to their respective inter-
ests in distributable marital property, offsetting puts both parties in the
same position they would have been in had there been no waiver. The
military retiree's intended benefits remain intact.
Second, by offsetting, state courts can provide uniformity, which may
positively affect military personnel management. One of the concerns of
the Court in McCarty was that state court authority to categorize and
distribute retired pay according to state property distribution principles
caused military personnel, who are subject to deployment and unstable
domicile, to be involuntarily subject to the laws of a state that distributes
retired pay. However, every state court that awards an offset of other
marital property in providing equity would still be subject to the limita-
tions prescribed by the federal payment scheme. Therefore, regardless of
the jurisdiction distributing the property, federal law would still dictate
the scope of state court authority. Additionally, because offsetting pro-
vides uniformity, even among community property states, and places
military personnel in the same economic position they would be in if they
did not opt for disability waiver, offsetting does not hinder personnel
management. Since an offset award would provide the former spouse
with the value of the waived retired portion, the interest in which accrues
during the marriage, even post-dissolution waivers would not circumvent
a state's authority to treat such portion as marital. Thus, there is no par-
ticular incentive to postpone retirement in an effort to alter or delay a
former spouse's entitlement to the value of the property. Furthermore,
even the McCarty Court recognized that the federal payment system is
questionable as an inducement for enlistment and re-enlistment in the
armed services or as a means of ensuring a "youthful and vigorous" mili-
tary.335 Any effect on these considerations is minimal, and the USFSPA
itself has subordinated these concerns to the protection of the former
spouse.
Third, offsetting provides equity for former spouses by assuring that
they receive the value of the entitlement to which they contributed dur-
ing the marriage. As Justice O'Connor stated in Mansell:
335. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 234 n.26 (suggesting that a congressional amendment to the
military retirement system to better accomplish its personnel management goals and per-




[T]he main purpose of the statute ... is to recognize the sacrifices
made by military spouses and to protect their economic security
in the face of a divorce .... Retirement pay, moreover, is often
the single most valuable asset acquired by military couples....
Reading the [USFSPA] as not precluding States from characteriz-
ing retirement pay waived to receive disability benefits as prop-
erty divisible upon divorce is faithful to the clear remedial pur-
poses of the statute in a way that the Court's interpretation is
not.3"
VIII. CONCLUSION
Congress created the USFSPA to protect the economic security of for-
mer spouses of military personnel. One of the most significant property
interests affording economic security to former spouses is the marital
interest in retired pay to which both spouses contributed during the mar-
riage. However, after the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Mansell v. Mansell, many state courts interpreted the USFSPA to operate
to allow a military retiree who waives a portion of retired pay for disabil-
ity pay to unilaterally deprive a former spouse of his or her interest in
that property and thereby obtain the benefit of the property for him or
herself. Courts that interpret the USFSPA as prohibitive of state court
authority to remedy this inequity by characterizing the waived portion of
retired pay as marital property subject to equitable consideration under
state property distribution law facilitate this inequity by not acting on the
remedial authority that Congress already afforded under the Act.
By authorizing state courts to treat disposable retired pay as any other
marital property under state property distribution principles, Congress
necessarily intended that state courts would consider the waived portion
of retired pay in distributing other marital property and remedy any re-
sulting inequity by offsetting with other marital property the portion of
retired pay that was waived for disability pay. The developments in fed-
eral policy regarding many other federal benefits, including Social Secu-
rity and Railroad Retirement benefits, support an interpretation of the
USFSPA that allows for state courts to offset in this manner. Offsetting
with other marital property in accordance with state property law pro-
motes equity between the parties, ensures economic security for both
parties, and does no damage to military personnel management or other
federal objectives underlying the purpose of the USFSPA.
Thus, Congress need not amend the USFSPA to authorize state courts
to remedy this inequitable consequence of the federal military payment
scheme. Instead, state courts need only to act under the authority that
336. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 602-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Congress has already afforded under the USFSPA by offsetting with
other marital property that portion of retired pay that is waived for dis-
ability pay. In so doing, state courts will uniformly provide equity for
military spouses and still adhere to the federal objectives underlying the
USFSPA.
